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The community policing strategies that were in place in September of 2001 were 
not effective at meeting the threat of terrorism.  American police agencies are at the 
threshold of a new era in policing, which has not yet been fully identified.  This thesis 
will explore the limitations of community policing.  A new model identified as Enterprise 
Policing is proposed to meet homeland security challenges.    
Enterprise Policing is a term developed to identify a policing style that embodies 
community policing as an organizational philosophy rather than a program.  It includes 
interacting or networking in unprecedented ways with other law enforcement and 
government agencies, as well as community members, for the purpose of informal 
communication and mutual support.  Under this policing style, neighborhood policing 
teams will resemble regional networks created for mutual assistance to exchange 
information and ensure public safety.    
Enterprise Policing is flexible and resilient.  It is focused on prevention and 
preparedness as well as response and recovery.  Unlike community policing, Enterprise 
Policing involves the use of technology and training for information sharing and the 
development of actionable intelligence.  It is intended to address national and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the attention of most United States police chiefs was 
focused on creating community partnerships and implementing some form of 
community-oriented policing philosophies in their agencies.  They were responding to the 
spiraling crime rates of the 1960s and 1970s.  Shortly after the beginning of the new 
millennium, America’s police agencies would be faced with a new threat to public safety, 
a threat which would require organizational changes.  
September 11, 2001, was a turning point for American law enforcement.  
Immediately following the attacks, local, state and federal law 
enforcement agencies faced service demands, problems and issues that 
they had never seen before.  Within the next year, agencies witnessed how 
those developments affected budgets, operational priorities, training, and 
personnel.  Sweeping reforms were not far behind.  The passage of federal 
and state laws is only now being felt, and these mandates will surely 
continue to instigate additional changes in police organizations’ missions 
and strategies.  Pending federal grant and technical assistance programs 
will also drive significant restructuring, as police agencies position 
themselves to receive that support.1    
Prior to 9/11, most police executives in America did not give much thought to 
terrorism as a significant public safety issue for their communities.  Major threats seemed 
to be drugs, guns, and gangs, all of which had resulted in the loss of thousands of lives.  
Also of concern were burglary, robbery, theft, and other traditional crimes connected 
with gangs and drugs.  The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1995 
Oklahoma City federal building bombing were isolated incidents of terrorism in the 
minds of most Americans.  The quick identification and apprehension of suspects in those 
cases masked the impending doom.  Perceptions changed rapidly on 9/11 at 8:46 a.m. 
(Eastern Time), when the first plane crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center.  The attacks of that day represented a new, unanticipated challenge for America’s 
police agencies, all of which were caught off guard.   In spite of all of the efforts taken by 
law enforcement agencies to implement community policing philosophies and methods, 
                                                 
1 Gerard R. Murphy, et al, Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law 
Enforcement Series, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.:  Police Executive Research Forum, 2003), xi.  
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local police agencies lacked the capability to prevent or to respond adequately to such 
attacks.  Intelligence about the impending attacks was non-existent to local police 
agencies, obvious signs were ignored, and technology was not in place to enable a more 
effective response to the disastrous consequences of terrorist attacks.   
Much of what has been written about the local law enforcement response to 
terrorism suggests some form of community policing as the appropriate strategy to 
address the issue of homeland security.  This thesis will explore the limitations of 
community policing strategies on September 11, 2001, and recommend a new model to 
address those limitations.  The study will also focus on the need for police agencies to 
implement new technologies and to network with other law enforcement agencies in 
unprecedented ways.  
A report delivered to the President and the Congress in December 2003 indicated, 
“Preparedness for combating terrorism requires measurable demonstrated capacity by 
communities, states, and private-sector entities throughout the Untied States to respond to 
acute threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts by all of the 
essential participants including elected officials, police, fire, medical, public health,  
emergency managers, intelligence, community organizations, the media and the public at 
large.”2   This research will propose that police departments form new alliances and 
networks with other government agencies and the community in order to bridge 
information sharing gaps and make communities safer.   
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on the history of changes in American policing typically characterize 
periods of change as eras.  Kelling and Moore identified three distinct phases of change 
in American policing:   
The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and 
politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during 
the 1840s, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the 
                                                 
2James S. Gilmore III, et al, “V. FORGING AMERICA’S NEW NORMALCY:  Securing Our 
Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty,” Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Arlington, Virginia:  Advisory Panel, December 15, 2003), 8.  
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early 1900s.  The reform strategy developed into reaction to the political.  
It took hold in the 1930s, thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, began to 
erode during the late 1970s, and arguably gave way to the community 
policing strategy during the early and mid-1980s.3 
For the most part, this latest generation of policing has served communities well.  
Crime rates have dropped drastically as police agencies have sought to address the root 
causes of crime and reduce the fear of crime.  Community trust and respect for police has 
increased from the 1960s when it was commonplace to hear police officers referred to as 
“pigs.”  Much has been written about the effectiveness of community policing 
philosophies.  Some have even suggested that community policing strategies are 
appropriate for coping with the terrorism threat.  For example, Scheider and Chapman, 
senior social science analysts with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, have indicated that the three inter-related elements of 
community policing – organizational change, problem solving, and external relationships 
– are sufficient to enable police agencies to prevent and respond to terrorism in an 
effective manner.4  Although there may be some basis for that view, implementation of 
those strategies on September 11, 2001, did little to stop the largest single terrorist attack 
in the history of the world.       
David Carter suggests bolstering community policing with intelligence-led 
policing strategies to more effectively prevent terrorism:   
The prudent executive will explore these avenues as part of a 
comprehensive, community-wide homeland security strategy.  Because of 
all of the concern for terrorism and Islamic extremism, the need to 
embrace all elements of the community becomes an even higher priority.  
As noted by the Muslim Public Affairs Council:  ‘Ultimately, U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts will require a partnership between policymakers 
and the American Muslim community. . .’5  
Several works cite the significance of the role of local law enforcement in the 
security of America’s homeland.  The 9/11 Commission recommended that local police 
                                                 
3 Francis X. Hartmann, ed., Debating the Evolution of American Policing, Perspectives on Policing 
(Washington, D.C.:  National Institute of Justice, 1988), 1. 
4 Rob Chapman and Matthew C. Scheider, “Community Policing and Terrorism.” Journal of 
Homeland Security (December 13, 2004): 15.  
5 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence:  A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Agencies 
(Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, November 2004), 51. 
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agencies receive more training and develop effective working relationships with federal 
agencies so that they may work cooperatively to identify terrorist suspects.6  Scheider and 
Chapman note, “A great deal of the responsibility for preparing and responding to 
terrorist events rests with local police departments.”7  A RAND Corporation monograph 
reinforced that finding by stating, “Law enforcement plays a critical role in responding 
to, preventing, and deterring terrorist attacks.”8  Also, a report published by the Police 
Executive Research Forum states, “Law enforcement agencies have historically been 
charged with preserving the safety and security of the public.  Regrettably, the mission is 
no longer limited to traditional crime – the prevention and deterrence of another terrorist 
attack on American soil have become a crucial part of this mission, leaving law 
enforcement agencies at every level of government responsible for restoring and 
maintaining a public sense of security.”9 
Other reports address the importance of community networking as a means to 
enhance public safety.  Examples are cited in the Citizen Corps initiative launched by the 
federal government in 2002.  The purpose was to have citizens take a more active role in 
emergency preparedness issues and to establish partnerships with first responders.10   
Arguing that an “entrepreneurial” form of government should be established, 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler wrote, “Perhaps the only public system in worse shape 
than education and health care is criminal justice.  Since 1960, violent crime has 
increased 12 times faster than our population.  Our murder, and rape, and robbery rates 
are the highest in the world.  Our courts and prisons are so full that criminals know real 
punishment is unlikely.  Yet the system is bankrupting state and county government.”11 
                                                 
6 Thomas H. Kean et al.  The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
2004), 390. 
7 Chapman and Scheider, “Community Policing,” 2. 
8 Lois M. Davis, et al., When Terrorism Hits Home − How Prepared Are State and Local Law 
Enforcement? (Santa Monica:  RAND Corporation, 2004), iii. 
9 Stephan A. Loyka et al., Protecting Your Community From Terrorism:  Strategies for State and Local 
Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.:  Police Executive Research Forum, Volume 4, February 2005), 1. 
10 President George W. Bush, Citizen Corps – A Guide for Local Officials (Washington, D.C.:  Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2002), 8.  
11 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government:  How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector, From Schoolhouse, City Hall, to the Pentagon  (New York:  Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1992), 319.   
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In a study of organizational change in police departments, Jihong Zhao, a noted 
author and criminal justice professor at the University of Nebraska, focuses on two 
models of police organizations – a bureaucratic model and a community oriented policing 
model.  He demonstrates that change in police departments is typically forced, in 
response to a turbulent external environment, rather than consciously chosen. Writing in 
1996, Zhao opined that the movement toward community oriented policing was more of a 
preliminary phase of organizational change than a substantial paradigm shift.12  Zhao 
explained that even a cursory review of police organizational change suggests the 
bureaucratic model of policing continues to exist in many American police departments 
and efforts to implement community policing philosophies fall short of their potential.  
Since Zhao conducted his research, the terrorist threat to America has 
materialized.  The threat of terrorism which now challenges American law enforcement 
agencies is a clear example of a “turbulent external environment” mentioned by Zhao as a 
precursor to change.   
Reinforcing the need for change, a 1995 RAND study of police agencies 
throughout America found that state and local law enforcement agencies were not 
prepared to respond to domestic terrorism.  In particular, it found there was “poor liaison 
and communication with federal and state officials, little or no training related to 
terrorism preparedness, little or no intelligence and strategic threat-assessment capability, 
and minimal expert review of plans and training exercises.”13  
 
C. HYPOTHESES  
According to the 9/11 Commission, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
“…revealed four areas of failure:  in imagination, policy, capabilities, and 
management.”14  Although the commission was referring primarily to federal agencies, 
similar failures also existed at state and local government levels.  Prior to the terrorist 
attacks, America’s local law enforcement executives considered gangs and drugs as the 
                                                 
12 Jihong Zhao, Why Police Organizations Change:  A Study of Community-Oriented Policing  
(Washington, D.C.:  Police Executive Research Forum, 1996), 1-40. 
13 Davis et al., When Terrorism Hits Home, xv. 
14 Kean et al., The 9/11 Commission Report, 339. 
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major threats to public safety in their communities.  The thought of terrorism was not a 
significant concern to most police chiefs on September 10, 2001.  By the next day, it 
became apparent that local police departments have a significant role to play in the 
prevention and response to terrorism.  The hypothesis of this thesis is:  
• The community policing strategies that were in place on September11, 
2001, were not effective at meeting the challenge to public safety posed by the 
threat of terrorism in America.  If police agencies are to contribute to America’s 
homeland security mission and to the prevention of terrorism in the future, they 
will need to become more enterprise-structured, resilient, intelligence-led, and 
networked-based.  
• This study will examine the reality of community policing philosophies 
that existed at the time of the attacks and recommend changes that should be 
considered by police executives.  It will begin with an explanation of the nature 
and future potential of the threat and will incorporate readings related to the 
asymmetric threat of terrorism, and the countless vulnerabilities that are present in 
American communities.  The thesis will explore possible reasons why community 
policing as developed in the United States was inadequate and ineffective as a 
strategy to prevent the attacks of 9/11.  Citing a study from the Police Executive 
Research Forum, it will address both key inhibitors and facilitators of change in 
police culture and their relationship to the implementation of community policing 
philosophies. 
This study will also review the definitions of law enforcement intelligence and 
intelligence-led policing.  Michigan State University Professor David Carter suggests that 
intelligence analysis in local police agencies needs to evolve to meet current challenges.  
Moreover, this study will discuss the need for local police agencies to network in 
unprecedented ways in the future.  This will involve networking with state and federal 
law enforcement agencies in more effective ways, establishing relationships with 
community members and their organizations, maintaining contact with other local police 
agencies, and facilitating communication between individual police officers within the 
same agency.    
 7
This research will integrate these issues and call for a new model of policing, 
which I term “Enterprise Policing.”  This model involves a new form of collaboration 
with the community and other government agencies.  Enterprise Policing begins with 
new adaptations of community policing and incorporates new technologies.  I will cite 
RAND research on the future of police training. The study will outline how police 
agencies can gear their training efforts toward a more value-based learning environment 
that will enable more effective problem identification and problem solving strategies.  
This study will conclude with the recognition that police agencies cannot predict 
or address every terrorist threat to homeland security, acknowledging that the provision 
of well-planned, common sense policies for organizational change are the best hope for 
the future of public safety.  
 
D. METHODOLOGY   
The methodology used in this research will be a review and analysis of literature 
relevant to terrorism, the evolution of community policing, changes necessary to meet the 
demands of the threat of terrorism, and the measurement of the effectiveness of 
organizational change.  The study will cite comments from a June 24, 2005, meeting of 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police Community Policing Committee 
regarding weaknesses in police agencies’ implementation of community policing 
philosophies.  It will incorporate the views of a prominent Muslim concerning the 
enhancement of police-Muslim relations in America.  
Following an assessment of the current model of policing, I will suggest an 
organizational shift toward a more effective enterprise policing model as a response to 
terrorist threats to homeland security.  
 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
1. Introduction 
“We have some planes.”  At 8:24 a.m. on September 11, 2001, these words were 
transmitted via radio from American Airlines Flight #11.  They were spoken by one of 
the terrorists who had hijacked the doomed plane and transformed it into an incendiary 
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device destined to disintegrate the North Tower of the World Trade Center 18 minutes 
later.  This began an unprecedented day of shock and suffering in the United States.15  
No one heard that fateful transmission.  The air traffic controller had been busy 
trying to contact the pilot on an emergency frequency 10 minutes prior to the time the 
transmission was made because the controller noted that the plane was not flying in a 
proper path.  When the terrorist spoke, his transmission was unintelligible to the 
controller.  That failure to receive and interpret information critical to security is 
symbolic of the inadequacy of America’s methods of communication and response to 
terrorist threats.  Among other things, law enforcement agencies at all levels of 
government in America have had to re-think their methods of communicating with each 
other and the communities they serve.   
Research to date has suggested that the primary elements of community oriented 
policing provide America’s law enforcement agencies with a strategy that is appropriate 
to address the threat of future terrorism.  However, the strategies that were in place on 
September 11, 2001, were not effective in preventing the terrorist attacks that day, nor 
were they adequate for an effective response in the aftermath.  This thesis will explore the 
limitations of community policing strategies on September 11, 2001.  It will also address 
the inability of those strategies to prevent terrorist attacks and recommend a new model 
of policing to rectify those limitations.   
 
2. The Nature of the Threat 
Chapter II defines terrorism and explains the diversity of the terrorist threat.  A 
rationale for change in the way American law enforcement agencies respond to threats to 
public safety, including the continuing danger of terrorism, will be proposed. 
 
3. The History of Law Enforcement Change 
Chapter III summarizes the evolution of policing and suggests how police 
organizations change.  The status of community oriented policing as it existed on 
September 11, 2001, is critically assessed and a case for a new era in policing is made. 
                                                 
15 Kean et al., The 9/11 Commission Report, 19. 
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4. Enterprise Policing  
Chapter IV addresses the need for law enforcement to move toward a more 
technology-driven, intelligence-led model.  Necessary changes in police training are 
identified.  Significant elements of the Enterprise Policing model are highlighted, 
including unprecedented ways of networking with the community and other government 
agencies.  Critical relationships between law enforcement agencies and various segments 
of the community are emphasized. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Chapter V reiterates the need for police organizational change and considers the 
need for balance between public safety and civil liberty.  The importance of strategic 
planning and exhibiting strong leadership during challenging times is emphasized.   
Examples of how one agency is approaching organizational change and how others 
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II. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
A. DEFINITION 
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. “Both political and 
academic efforts to get to grips with terrorism have repeatedly been hung up on the issue 
of definition, of distinguishing terrorism from criminal violence or military action.”16  
Most of the definitions make reference to the use, or threatened use, of unlawful violence. 
For example, the U.S. State Department, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the 
Department of Defense each define terrorism differently, according to their own 
priorities.  The State Department derives its definition of terrorism from Title 22 of the 
United States Code, Section 2656 f (d):  “Terrorism is the premeditated, politically 
motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”17  Under that definition, it is implied 
that violence or force by “subnational” groups is unlawful.  That is, the only legitimate 
use of force lies with the government.   
The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses the Code of Federal Regulations’ 
definition,    “. . . the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.”18  This definition makes it clear that terrorist 
acts are, by definition, unlawful.  The Department of Defense defines it as, “. . . the 
unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives.”19  Once again, the term “unlawful” is used to describe terrorist 
acts.   
                                                 
16 Charles Townshend, Terrorism – A Very Short Introduction (New York:  Oxford University Press 
Inc., 2002), 3. 
17 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1998), 38.  
18 Terrorist Research and Analytic Center, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Terrorism in the United States 1995 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, 1996) vi. 
19 United States Departments of the Army and Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflicts, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 (Washington, D.C.:  Headquarters, Departments 
of the Army and Air Force, 1996), 3-1.  
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Noted terrorism expert, Bruce Hoffman, provides a more encompassing definition 
of terrorism as:   
…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the 
threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.  Terrorism is 
specifically designed to have far reaching psychological effects beyond 
the immediate victim(s) or object of the attack.  It is meant to instill fear 
within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might 
include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national 
government or political party, or public opinion in general.  Terrorism is 
designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power 
where there is very little.  Through the publicity generated by their 
violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they 
otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or national 
scale.20 
Regardless of the definition used, terrorism is a threat to public safety and 
problematic for America’s local law enforcement agencies.  While this is not a new 
threat, it is one that poses serious issues for police administrators to ponder as they 
prepare their departments to meet it.   
 
B. THE DIVERSE GROUPS 
Although much media attention has been given to domestic terrorism caused by 
right wing and Islamic extremists since the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, 
there have been over 3,000 documented terrorist incidents during the past 50 years in 
United States and Puerto Rico.  The terrorists involved in these incidents are diverse.  
They are domestic and foreign and they have exhibited two very distinctive features.  
First, they are extremely diverse in their beliefs.  They are black and white extremists, 
Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis, anti-abortionists, militant Jews, and others.  Second, 
they are divided into numerous groups and factions and some of them are not connected 
with any organizations.21    
Terrorism involves many groups, many instruments and, often, no central 
command.  Terrorists are not a single foe, and no simple theory of 
deterrence can possibly apply to the spectrum that ranges from anti-U.S. 
                                                 
20 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43-44.  
21 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America – From the Klan to al Qaeda (London and 
New York:  Routledge, 2003), 10-11.  
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or anti-Israeli ‘martyrs’ to members of American right-wing militias.  To 
make matters worse, some of the newer terrorists are not motivated to 
spare innocents, are more generally uninhibited, and do not calculate 
thresholds of pain and tolerance in society in the same way that 
mainstream terrorists of earlier decades did.22  
In addition to having diverse membership, modern terrorists represent an 
asymmetric threat and employ irregular tactics.  “Terrorist tactics focus attention on the 
importance of information and communications for the functioning of democratic 
institutions. . . .”23   According to John Arquilla, this focus on information has lead to an 
organization of asymmetrical terrorist networks who engage in netwar, “. . . an emerging 
mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, including measures short of traditional war, 
in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, 
strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.”24  Netwar is increasingly 
becoming a significant threat to public safety.  Martin Van Creveld explains the threat:   
In today’s world, the main threat to many states, including specifically the 
U.S., no longer comes from other states.  Instead, it comes from small 
groups and other organizations that are not states.  Either we make the 
necessary changes and face them today, or what is commonly known as 
the modern world will lose all sense of security and will dwell in perpetual 
fear.25   
In his explanation of a new form of terrorism, noted author Walter Laqueur stated, 
“Most international and domestic terrorism today is not ideological (in the sense of left or 
right) but is ethnic-separatist in inspiration. . . .  In the past, terrorism was almost always 
the province of groups of militants that had the backing of political forces; in the future, 
terrorists might be individuals on the pattern of the Unabomber or like-minded people 
working in very small groups.”26  
                                                 
22 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism – A 
Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica:  RAND, 2002), 7.  
23 Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1999), 72. 
24 Ibid., 47. 
25 Martin Van Creveld, “In Wake of Terrorism, Modern Armies Prove to be Dinosaurs of Defense,” 
New Perspectives Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Fall 1996): 58.  
26 Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning (Washington, D.C.:  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), 113. 
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After the July 7, 2005, suicide terrorist attacks on the London subway system, the 
Associated Press surveyed veteran students of international terrorism who see the 
prospect of an “endless” war with al Qaeda members who are mutating into a global 
insurgency that could become a prototype for other 21st century movements, 
technologically astute and almost always leaderless.27  
 
C. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF VIOLENCE 
The types of violent acts committed by terrorists are seemingly limitless.  Bombings are 
certainly one of the more common forms of terrorism.  The first attack on the World Trade 
Center in 1993 by Islamic extremists and the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building 
in 1995 by anti-government extremists are vivid examples.  Suicide attacks are also prevalent.  
They can take the form of suicidal bombers, as was the case on the subway system in London 
on July 7, 2005, on the trains in Madrid, Spain during 2004, and, of course, in the September 
11, 2001, suicidal plane crashes in America.   
Terrorist attacks can take many other forms.  They can involve attacks on 
America’s critical infrastructure, including agriculture and food, water resources, energy 
and telecommunications systems, banking and finance institutions, and transportation 
systems as well.  In a July 8, 2005, New York Times editorial, it was noted that deadly 
chemicals are shipped by rail every day into all major cities in America.  The author 
estimated that a simple attack on one tanker car could kill as many as 100,000 people in 
30 minutes.28    
Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world watched the passenger 
planes, commandeered by terrorists, crash into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
on September 11, and wondered if there could be a worse scenario.  Unfortunately, the 
answer is “yes.”    
It has become clear over the last decade that we need to look into the 
future to assess the possibility of terrorists acquiring and using so-called 
weapons of ‘mass destruction’ (WMD) – chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons.  Although they did not involve such weapons, the unprecedented 
                                                 
27 Charles J. Haney, “New York and Washington.  Bali, Riyadh, Istanbul, Madrid. And now London.  
Where will it end?  Where will it all lead?”  Associated Press, New York Times, July 9, 2005. 
28“The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy,” New York Times, July 8, 2005. 
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scale of the September 11 attacks seemed to bring this exponential 
expansion of destruction a big step closer. . . .  In technological terms, the 
risks are undeniably increasing.29  
RAND researchers Paul K Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins have also expressed 
other concerns about terrorists and WMDs. 
Deterring acquisition and use of WMD is profoundly important and 
difficult.  Terrorists appear to have grandiose intentions, and some have 
intense interest in such weapons.  Moreover, they may believe that they 
have what a Cold War theorist would call “escalation dominance.”  That is 
al Qaeda could use WMD against the United States, but retaliation – and 
certainly escalation – would be difficult because (1) the United States will 
not use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; (2) its nuclear 
weapons would seldom be suitable for use: and (3) there are no good 
targets (the terrorists themselves fade into the woodwork).  And, of course, 
the United States has constraints.30   
Thus, the concept of “superterrorism” is not one that can be taken lightly and 
cannot be overlooked.  
The threat to public safety has in no way diminished since the September 11 
attacks. In fact, according to a RAND research study, there were 5,362 deaths that 
resulted from terrorist acts worldwide between March 2004 and March 2005.  This was 
nearly double the total number of deaths for the preceding 12 months.31  
Terrorism cannot be eradicated.  “Deterrence is difficult because, for many of the 
people involved, terrorism is a way of life.  Terrorist organizations may hurt badly, but 
those that cause the most concern seldom go out of existence.  For one thing, terrorism 
provides ‘positives’ – notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards.  More 
important than this, however, terrorism is the raison d’etre of these organizations.”32   
Noted military theorist Dr. John Arquilla has stated, “The reason more terrible attacks 
haven’t occurred is that the period we’re in is just a decade old.”33   In America the 
                                                 
29 Townshend, Terrorism, 32. 
30 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, 39.  
 31 Haney, “New York and Washington,” 2005.  
 32 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence, 5. 
 33Philip Ross, Terror and Its Antidote, “Acumen Journal of Life Sciences,” (New York:  Rodman and 
Renshaw, December 2003), 70. 
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Vulnerable, Stephen Flynn points out, “The White House, the Pentagon, and the new 
Department of Homeland Security must assume that our enemy will soon launch far more 
deadly and disruptive attacks than what we experienced on September 11, 2001.  The 
potential scenarios are almost unlimited.”34    
This is the threat that American law enforcement agencies now face.  It is not one 
that the first responders have been well prepared for in the past.  Bruce Hoffman stated 
the challenge succinctly, “In sum, the emergence of this new breed of terrorist adversary 
means that nothing less than a sea-change in our thinking and the policies required to 
counter it will be required.  Too often in the past, we have lulled ourselves into believing 
that terrorism was among the least serious or complex of security issues.  We cannot 















                                                 
34 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable (New York:  Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 17. 
35 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 212. 
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III. HISTORY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICING 
A. CHANGE 
American policing has changed significantly since it began during the 1800s.  
Much of this change has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and has been the 
result of societal change more than innovative police management.  “Law enforcement 
has a well-earned reputation for resisting change, especially when change threatens to 
control law enforcement behavior.”36  Certainly, police managers have implemented 
change, but much of that change was initiated by environmental forces.  In 1984, Robert 
D. Pursley wrote, 
Traditionally, the police have been very slow to change.  When change has 
occurred, it has usually…been brought about by such external forces as 
the courts or reform groups rather than by the police ... themselves.  
Although these outside influences have brought about many needed 
reforms in the … police service, such changes, because they are externally 
rather than internally induced, have too…often been temporary in nature. 
As a result, once external pressures relaxed, change had a tendency…to 
decelerate rapidly.37  
Pursley went on to note that many of the changes in policing involved the use of 
technological innovations such as automobiles and two-way radios that were 
superimposed on old traditions, practices, and philosophies.  In a more recent (1996) 
study, Jihong Zhao suggested that alterations in police organizations have occurred 
primarily as a result of forced adaptation to the external environment.  These adaptations, 
he implies do not represent significant changes in organizational domains or structures.38   
George Kelling and Mark Moore have suggested that there are three distinct eras of 
change in policing:  the political era, the reform era and the community policing era.39   
                                                 
36 Bernard H. Levin and Richard W. Myers, A Proposal for an Enlarged Range of Policing:  
Neighborhood Driven Policing, Futures Working Group, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy, 
(Quantico, Virginia:  U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 2005), 4.  
37 Robert D. Pursley, Introduction to Criminal Justice – Third Edition (New York:  Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1984), 226. 
38 Zhoa, Why Police Organizations Change, xii. 
39George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, “From Political to Reform to Community:  The Evolving 
Strategy of Police,” in Community Policing:  Rhetoric or Reality? ed. J. Green and S. Mastrofski (New 
York:  Praeger, 1988), 1-26.    
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Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley offer a slightly different, but complementary view, 
suggesting that a study of police change must focus on two models, the bureaucratic 
model and the community oriented policing model.40   
In A Critical History of Police Reform, Samuel Walker notes countless examples 
of successful organizational change in police history that have lead to greater 
accountability.41  In both his and Robert Folgelson’s study of police history, focus is on 
the reform era, which they view as being instituted by citizen dissatisfaction with political 
corruption and poor quality of urban life at the turn of the century.42  The change in 
policing became part of a national reform movement in America during the Progressive 
Era.43  
 
B. THE POLITICAL ERA  
The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and 
politics, dated from the introduction of police in municipalities during the 
1840s, continued through the Progressive Period, and ended during the 
early 1900s.44   
To understand just how strongly the patronage system controlled the police during 
that period, it is instructive to note that, in many cases, the police were employed as an 
instrument of the dominant political party.45  Furthermore, police uniforms had their 
beginnings in the distinctive clothing worn by the police to identify their source of 
patronage.  In Philadelphia, for example, officers in one ward wore a specific type of hat 
while those in another ward wore a specific suit that connected each of them to their 
political affiliates.46 
                                                 
40Zhao, Why Police Organizations Change, 5.   
41 Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform (Lexington, Massachusetts:  D.C. Heath, 1977).  
42 Robert Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1977).  
43 Dennis W. Banas and Robert C. Trojanowicz, Uniform Crime Reporting and Community Policing:  
An Historical Perspective (Michigan State University:  The National Center for Community Policing, 
1985), 4. 
44 Zhao, Why Police Organizations Change, 3. 
45 Raymond B. Fosdick, American Police Systems (New York:  Century, 1920), 68.  
46 James T. Allison and Robert T. Penrose, Philadelphia, 1681-1887 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
Studies in Historical and Political Science, vol. II, 1887), 37-41.  
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During this period, the police were dominated by corruption and political control. 
The police themselves were involved in criminal activities on a daily basis under the 
protection of their political bosses.  Theft, drunkenness, and extortion of money from 
prisoners are examples of the crimes committed by the police officers, whose primary 
role was to keep the dominant political party in power.47   The subsequent change to the 
Reform Era of policing resulted not from internal forces, but from a national movement 
to eliminate corruption from government.   
Although it is not possible to examine all the features of municipal reform 
and their interrelationships, such characteristics as the adoption of civil 
service systems; nomination by petition; initiative, recall, and referendum; 
the short ballot; the council-manager form of government; nonpartisan 
elections; and certain sociological and demographic phenomena have 
brought significant changes to city governance and, as a direct 
consequence, to municipal police services.48    
 
C. THE REFORM ERA  
The reform strategy developed in reaction to the political.  It took hold 
during the 1930s, thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, began to erode 
during the 1970s, and arguably, gave way to the community strategy 
during the early and mid-1980s.  Both scholars and practitioners of 
American policing seem to agree that substantial organizational change 
during the first half of the century transformed the police from a political 
machine-controlled force into a paramilitary and bureaucratic model.49    
These changes were concurrent with the scientific management principals 
proposed by Frederick Taylor emphasizing workplace efficiency, span of control, unity 
of command, and standardized workplace practices.  
The police reforms that occurred at this time changed the focus of policing from a 
political patronage to a professional, crime control model.  “The police reform movement 
launched by Vollmer in the 1920s, which took hold in the 1930s, seemed to offer the 
promise that society was on the brink of solving the riddle of crime.  Police departments 
were now increasingly insulated from the political pressures that had spawned a variety 
                                                 
47 Pursley, Introduction to Criminal Justice, 145. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Zhao, Why Police Organizations Change, 3. 
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of abuses, and they were organized according to the principals of scientific management 
theory, which promised increased efficiency and effectiveness.”50     
A small crack in the police armor appeared during the 1950s when some 
community members began to voice concerns about isolationism from the police who 
were there to protect them.  Police agencies responded to this concern with the 
development of community relations units.  This worked well for a while and the 
bureaucratic, crime control, professional model of policing seemed to be the wave of the 
future until the turbulent 1960s.  
What began as a decade of hope under a new young president ended with 
spiraling crime rates, civil unrest, anti-war demonstrations and race riots throughout 
America.  A loose coalition of radical groups known as the New Left began clamoring for 
social change under the umbrella of social justice.  Members of the New Left began 
calling police officers “pigs” and viewed them as brutal agents of establishment 
oppression.  As talk of revolution rang out, the militant Black Power movement, which 
included such groups as the Black Panthers, became involved in a series of bloody 
clashes with the police.51   Black Panther member Eldridge Cleaver declared, “. . . a dead 
pig is the best pig of all.  We encourage people to kill them because they constitute an 
Army.”52   This general attitude toward the police was expressed by another Black 
Panther member: 
In our 400-year struggle for survival, it has been the guns and force 
manifested in the racist pig …cops that occupy our communities that 
directly oppress, repress, brutalize, and murder us . . .  So…when a self-
defense group moves against this oppressive system, by executing a pig by 
any means, …sniping, stabbing, bombing, etc., in defense against the 400 
years of racist brutality and murder, this …can only be defined correctly 
as self-defense.53  
                                                 
50 Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing – A Contemporary Perspective, 
(Cincinnati, Ohio:  Anderson Publishing Company, 1990), 61. 
51 Ibid., 65-66.  
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New Jersey:  Scarecrow Press, 1976), 172. 
53 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 63. 
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The social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s was so great that it generated four 
separate presidential commissions within a five-year period to study the problem 
(President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 1965; 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder 1967; National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence 1968; President’s Commission on Campus Unrest 
1970).54             
Fear of crime became a major public issue in the United States during the 1960s 
and, by 1970, public opinion polls revealed that crime was viewed as the most serious 
social problem in America – surpassing racial conflict, inflation, and even the Vietnam 
War.  Thus, the model that was designed to control crime was failing.  The isolation 
between the police and the communities they served contributed to this failing and led to 
the community policing era.   
 
D. THE COMMUNITY POLICING ERA  
Probably more books have been written and research studies conducted on the 
topic of community policing than all other police topics combined.  Community policing 
represents a model of policing that “. . . has evolved from a few small foot patrol studies 
to the preeminent reform agenda of modern policing.  With roots in such earlier 
developments as police-community relations, team policing, crime prevention, and the 
rediscovery of foot patrol, community policing has become, in the 1990s , the dominant 
strategy of policing – so much so that the 100,000 new police officers funded by the 1994 
Crime Bill must be engaged, by law, in community policing.”55             
Community policing concepts are in contrast to the precepts of the Reform Era, 
crime control model of policing.  “The two models represent differing sets of values and 
beliefs, differing key organizational structures and essential operational activities.  Both 
                                                 
54 William L. Tafoya, “Needs Assessment:  Key to Organizational Change,” Journal of Police Science 
and Administration (Gaithersburg, Maryland:  International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1983), 1. 
55 Robert G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert, Critical Issues in Policing, Fourth Edition (Prospect 
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models have their advocates and critics, and both model’s advocates can point to 
successes with their preferred approach and failures with the other approach.”56   
Of the two policing models, the community policing model represents a concept 
that is more complex and difficult to grasp.  There are four primary reasons for this: 
• Programmatic Complexity – Police departments throughout the country 
have instituted a countless variety of programs and practices under the heading of 
community policing.  There is no single definition or model.  
• Multiple Effects – There is no specific intended effect that is supposed to 
result from community policing practices.  For example, some say it is to reduce 
crime, while other say it is to create a closer bond with the community. 
• Variation In Program Scope – Community policing may involve a wide 
variety of programs or specialty units that have no bearing on department-wide 
practices. 
• Research Design Limitations – The countless studies that have been 
completed on the effects of community policing lack credibility due to the short-
term nature of these studies and lack of any real control groups.57  
Thus, it is very difficult to give a specific definition of community policing, much 
less identify the effectiveness of its practices and how well the concepts are being 
implemented in any given agency.  Gary Cordner notes,  
Community policing remains many things to many people.  A common 
refrain among proponents is ‘Community policing is a philosophy, not a 
program.’ An equally common refrain among police officers is, ‘Just tell 
me what you want me to do differently.’  Some critics, echoing concerns 
similar to those expressed by police officers, argue that if community 
policing is nothing more than a philosophy, it is merely an empty shell.58           
Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux view community policing as:  
…the first major reform in police departments since police departments 
embraced scientific management principles more than a half-century ago.  
It is now a dramatic change in the way police departments interact with 
the public, a new philosophy that broadens the police mission from a 
narrow focus on crime to a mandate that encourages the police to explore 
creative solutions for a host of community concerns, including crime, fear 
of crime, disorder, and neighborhood decay.  Community Policing rests on 
the belief that only by working together can the people and the police be  
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able to improve the quality of life in the community, with the police not 
only as enforcers, but also as advisors, facilitators, and supporters of new 
community-based, police supervised initiatives.59   
A simpler definition has been offered by the Community Policing Consortium.  
They define community policing as, “. . . a collaborative effort between the police and the 
community that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of 
the community in search of the solutions to these problems.”60  (The Community Policing 
Consortium was created by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and is comprised of 
representatives from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National 
Sheriff’s Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, 
the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Police Foundation.) 
Many police executives in America have tried to implement community policing 
philosophies by creating programs such as foot patrol or bicycle patrol.  In doing so, they 
have failed to truly institutionalize this model in their agencies.  Of course, this renders 
illusive any true measure of the effectiveness of its practices.  In fact, “Nearly all of the 
evaluations conducted to date have focused on the tactical dimension of community 
policing, leaving us with little or no information on the effects of philosophical, strategic, 
and organizational changes.”61  
It has been suggested by some that community policing represents an appropriate 
model to confront the homeland security issues posed by terrorism.  For example, 
Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman have stated that principles behind community 
policing – organizational change, problem solving, and external partnerships – enable 
police agencies to better deal with the threat of terrorist events and the fear they may 
create.62   
                                                 
59 Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, Community Policing – A Contemporary Perspective, 3. 
60 Lorie Fridell and Mary Ann Wycoff, eds., Community Policing – The Past, The Present, and The 
Future (Washington, D.C.:  The Anne E. Casey Foundation and the Police Executive Research Forum, 
November 2004), 3. 
61 Dunham and Alpert, Critical Issues in Policing, 507. 
 62Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, “Community Policing and Terrorism” 
(http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scheider-Chapman.html)  Viewed  January 20,  2006.   
 24
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has a Community 
Policing Committee.  Annually, members of that committee review the community 
policing practices of agencies throughout the world, and presents awards to outstanding 
agencies.  Recognizing the importance of community policing to homeland security, the 
committee created a new award in 2004 known as the Homeland Security Recognition 
Award.  Along with the Community Policing Awards, it is presented annually at the 
IACP Convention. 
A semi-annual meeting of this IACP committee was held in Itasca, Illinois, on 
June 24, 2005.  During that meeting, there was a discussion of the workshop for the 
Community Policing Award winners that will be conducted at the annual convention in 
October 2005.  It was decided that there was such a close connection between community 
policing and homeland security that the title of the 2005 workshop would be, 
“Communities Defending the Homeland:  The Front Line is Now in Your Back Yard.”63 
However, not everyone agrees that community policing and homeland security 
are complementary.  Willard M. Oliver, an associate professor of criminal justice at Sam 
Houston State University, wrote an article titled, “The Homeland Security Juggernaut:  
The End of the Community Policing Era?”  In his article, he argues that the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, have ushered in a new era as community policing concepts and 
homeland security needs are simply inconsistent.  “. . . Whether we like it or not, it is 
time to brace for a new era of policing, the era of Homeland Security.”64   Seattle Police 
Chief Gil Kerlikowske also sees an end to the Community Policing Era, but for different 
reasons.  Acknowledging that community policing has made significant contributions to 
the law enforcement profession, the post 9/11 era has brought about decreasing revenues 
and increasing crime which have signaled the end of community policing in America.65   
In a similar fashion, Darrel Stephens, Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department stated,  
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(Huntsville, Texas:  Sam Houston State University, March/April 2004), 10. 
65 Gil Kerlikowske, The End of Community Policing:  Remembering the Lessons Learned  
(Washington, D.C.:  FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 2004,) 6.    
 25
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, homeland security has 
emerged as a top national priority. . . .  The sagging economy has reduced 
revenue streams at every level of government and has further depleted 
funding for criminal justice.  Very few states do not have significant 
deficits that require increased taxes, reductions in expenditures, or both.  
These conditions create additional challenges to sustaining community 
problem-oriented policing.66 
One thing is clear.  The fragmented and disjointed manner in which police 
agencies have attempted to transition into the era of community policing was ineffective 
in preparing America’s local law enforcement agencies to handle the homeland security 
threat posed by terrorism on September 11, 2001.  The extraordinary thing about the 
attack on that day was that the 19 terrorists “. . . were preparing for their mission for 
months, leading normal lives with wives, taking the garbage out, taking their kids to 
McDonalds, taking flying lessons, living in comparatively pleasant places, all the while 
knowing that at some future date they were going to kill themselves and thousands of 
other people.”67    
The model of policing that was created to bring the police closer to the public 
they serve, and to give them a better understanding of problems in the community, failed 
to provide them with any suspicion about 19 people who were leading middle class lives 
in American communities and were planning the biggest terrorist attack in the history of 
the world.  At least, the way in which many police agencies have adapted to the 
community policing model failed on that fateful day.  America’s police agencies are now 
entering a new era of change.   This next era has not yet been defined, but the challenges 
that face law enforcement agencies are apparent.  They must now cope with the 
traditional crime and disorder in their communities as well as find ways to cope with 
threats to public safety posed by terrorism.  This next chapter proposes a policing model 
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IV. ENTERPRISE POLICING 
In “Forging America’s New Normalcy,” The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction argued, 
“Officials at the Federal level should lead the development of an enterprise architecture 
to institutionalize intelligence and information sharing, risk assessments, better integrated 
planning and training, and effective requirements generation in close coordination with 
State and local governments and the private sector..”68   Local law enforcement agencies 
in America must do likewise in order to meet the strategic objectives posed by The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.69  
 
A. DEFINITION 
The word “enterprise” suggests an industrious undertaking and a readiness to 
embark on new ventures.70  “Enterprise Policing” is a term developed to identify a 
policing style that embodies community policing as an organizational philosophy rather 
than a program.  It includes interacting or networking in unprecedented ways with other 
law enforcement and government agencies, as well as community members, for the 
purpose of informal communication and mutual support.  Under this policing style, the 
neighborhood policing teams of the future may very well resemble regional networks 
created for mutual assistance, to exchange information, and ensure community safety.    
In our information age, Enterprise Policing recognizes that police officers are only one 
component of a much larger network comprised of all types of people including police 
officers, businessmen, professionals, and others who are responsible for community 
policing. 
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Enterprise Policing is flexible and resilient.  It is focused on prevention and 
preparedness as well as response and recovery.  Unlike community policing, Enterprise 
Policing also involves the use of technology and training for the purpose of information 
sharing and the development of actionable intelligence.   It is intended to address national 
and transnational policing issues as well as local concerns that may impact public safety 
in a community.    
 
B. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Of the objectives delineated in America’s homeland security strategy, prevention 
is arguably the most important.  If America was able to somehow prevent all terrorist 
attacks, the other two objectives would become moot.  While that is simply not possible, 
there is still much that can be done to improve America’s prevention efforts.   The first 
component of the Enterprise Policing model is intelligence. “New security threats require 
new approaches to information collection, analysis, and dissemination.  We no longer 
face only known enemies who operate almost entirely overseas.  Although the terrorist 
threat is foreign, they operate all over the globe including, as we know so well since 
September 11, in this country.”71  
For law enforcement agencies, prevention begins with information collection, 
analysis, and dissemination.  As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report,  
The future challenges of America’s intelligence agencies are daunting.  
They include the need to develop leading edge technologies that give our 
policy makers and warfighters a decisive edge in any conflict where the 
interests of the United States are vital.  Not only does good intelligence 
win wars, but the best intelligence enables us to prevent them from 
happening altogether.72  
Before examining how this applies to America’s local law enforcement agencies, 
it is best to explain what intelligence is and what it is not.  “Because of misuse, the word 
‘intelligence’ means different things to different people.  The most common mistake is to 
consider ‘intelligence’ as synonymous with ‘information.’  Information is not 
intelligence.  Misuse has also led to the phrase ‘collecting intelligence’ instead of 
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‘collecting information.’  Although intelligence may be collected by and shared with 
intelligence agencies and bureaus, field operations generally collect information (or 
data).”73 
“Sherman Kent, an early theorist and practitioner of intelligence, defined 
intelligence as knowledge, as organization, and as an activity.  This definition allowed 
him to describe the way intelligence services collect and analyze information, the 
finished intelligence product agencies provide to policy makers, and the way intelligence 
services are organized.”74  A more contemporary theorist, Mark M. Lowenthal, 
differentiates between information and intelligence: “Information is anything that can be 
learned, regardless of how it may be discovered.  Intelligence refers to information that 
meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, refined, 
and narrowed to meet those needs. . . .  All intelligence is information; not all information 
is intelligence.”75   “Despite the many definitions of ‘intelligence’ that have been 
promulgated over the years, the simplest and clearest of these is ‘information plus 
analysis equals intelligence.’”76 
The purpose of an intelligence process is to avoid surprise.  The two most obvious 
examples of catastrophic surprises in America occurred on December 7, 1941, and 
September 11, 2001.  The two events represent different types of intelligence failures.  
The attacks by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, were not completely unexpected.  “A 
raid on Pearl Harbor was seen as equally likely in both the United States and Japan in the 
event of a war between the two countries.”77  This was an example of a strategic 
intelligence failure.  In contrast, “The strikes against the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon were, quite literally, bolts out of the blue.  The U.S. intelligence community 
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was caught completely off guard.”78   This represented a tactical failure, not only by the 
intelligence community, but also by the government policy makers who failed to react to 
the growing terrorist threat against America during the 1990s.   They simply did not 
recognize the danger posed by the asymmetric operations of a group of non-state actors.79   
On the other hand, 
Al Qaeda grasped the implications and opportunities globalization offered.  
However, to benefit from it necessitated the creation of a networked-based 
terrorist organization that exploited the tools of the information age.  And 
to secure its new global apparatus, al Qaeda employed the principles and 
methods of deception and denial typically found in intelligence tradecraft.  
In effect, UBL inspired a ‘revolution in terrorist affairs.’80   
America’s law enforcement agencies must now find ways to improve their own 
intelligence capabilities to cope with this new threat. The creation of effective 
intelligence capabilities can support policy makers in their deployment of resources and 
serve as a foundation for crime prevention and homeland security efforts.  The challenges 
facing law enforcement executives have been aptly delineated by University of Michigan 
Professor David L. Carter: 
• Recognize that every law enforcement agency – regardless of size or 
location – has a stake in this global law enforcement intelligence initiative and, as 
such, must develop some form of an intelligence capacity in order to be an 
effective consumer of intelligence products. 
• Develop a culture of collection among officers to most effectively gather 
information for use in the intelligence cycle. 
• Operationally integrate Intelligence-Led Policing into the police 
organization. 
• Recognize that increased information sharing at and between law 
enforcement agencies at all levels of government requires new commitments by 
law enforcement executives and managers. 
• Increase information sharing, as appropriate, with the broader public 
safety and private security sectors. 
• Protect data and records along with the rigid accountability of the 
intelligence function. 
• Keep law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence 
separate with respect to state and local officers on Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 
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• Broaden the scrutiny of intelligence records and practices by civil rights 
groups. 
• Routinely use intelligence to make better tactical and strategic decisions. 
• Increase regionalization in all aspects of the intelligence function as an 
ongoing initiative of law enforcement agencies at all levels of government. 
• Ensure that non-law enforcement government officials and the community 
understand what law enforcement intelligence is and the importance of their role 
in the intelligence function.81    
The term “Intelligence-Led Policing” originated in Great Britain and appeared in 
a 1997 publication by the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Analysts, Inc.  In Intelligence-Led Policing – International Perspectives on Policing in 
the 21st Century, it was noted that, while the term lacked a single, overarching definition, 
it involved “. . . the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end  
product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and the strategic 
levels.  It is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, 
rather than the reverse.”82   
In a September 2005 publication by the Bureau of Justice, intelligence-led 
policing was defined as “. . . a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence 
operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field has 
considered beneficial for many years.  To implement intelligence-led policing, police 
organizations need to reevaluate their current policies, and protocols.  Intelligence must 
be incorporated into the planning process to reflect community problems and issues.  
Intelligence sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice.  Most important, 
must be contingent on quality analysis of data.  The development of analytical 
techniques, training and technical assistance needs to be supported.”83     
In a 2000 report by the National Criminal Intelligence Service of the United 
Kingdom and other U.K. agencies, it was noted, “Intelligence has lagged behind in the 
investigation in the codification of best practice, professional knowledge, and in the 
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identification of selection and training requirements of staff.”84  The report, National 
Intelligence Model, proposed a model of policing that ensures information is researched 
and analyzed to enable police managers to: 
• Provide strategic direction. 
• Mark tactical resources allocation decisions. 
• More effectively manage risk.85  
In the United States, this concept of intelligence-led policing was discussed in a 
March 2002 summit on intelligence and information sharing, held by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police.86  The benefits of community policing – order 
maintenance and problem – solving were recognized.  The need for intelligence-led 
policing was identified, given the nature of complex, multijurisdictional crimes and 
terrorism.  “The primary outgrowth of the summit was the creation of the Global 
Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), which comprises approximately 30 intelligence 
professionals.  GIWG met quarterly during 2003 and developed the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), which was released and approved by the U.S. 
Attorney General in October 2003.”87   In the NCISP, six steps are listed in the 
intelligence process:  planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, 
dissemination, and reevaluation.  See Figure 1.88  
Proper planning assures the effectiveness of the intelligence collection process.  
The collection of intelligence must be focused, and guidelines must be established that 
clearly prohibit any unlawful collection of information.89  It is absolutely critical that all 
information placed into the intelligence system is relevant to criminal activity pursuant to 
the federal guidelines as delineated in 28 C.F.R. Part 23.90  (See Appendix.)  
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Figure 1.   Six Steps of Intelligence Process 
 
Data collection is typically a time-consuming process that can take several forms, 
including physical or electronic surveillance, the scanning of public records, and utilizing 
Internet resources.  The quality of the data collected will ultimately determine the quality 
of the intelligence product.  One of the difficulties police agencies may face, in both this 
process and the dissemination process, is that most of the available information 
technology is focused on the analysis or collation processes and does not address    
collection and dissemination.  “This is often because the companies that produce the 
intelligence systems are different from those that produce other public safety systems. . . .  
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Unfortunately, this has led to isolated intelligence systems which do not effectively 
integrate with mainstream systems such as CAD, RMS, Fire, Mobile Data, and so on.”91     
“To deal effectively with the threat of domestic terrorism, the police must be able 
to manage and coordinate different sources of data and intelligence, and then process 
them in such a way as to provide an enhanced understanding of actual or potential 
criminal activity.”92 Data processing and collation involves sorting through large amounts 
of information that has been collected from a variety of sources, extracting the useful data 
and putting it into some form that is helpful to the end user.93 
These are critical steps in the intelligence process.  If no analysis is done, it can 
lead to a failure to connect the dots and important information will remain undiscovered. 
Twenty years ago, when the U.S. marine base in Beirut was bombed, so much 
intelligence about terrorist threats poured in that the marines stopped taking it seriously.  
The problem was not insufficient information, but rather a lack of analysis.94    That same 
problem exists today, obviously on a different scale, in America’s police departments.  
They have vast amounts of information in their automated records systems and their 
computer aided dispatch systems, but they do not have an effective method of analyzing 
all of the data available to them. 
The analysis required in an intelligence-led policing environment goes 
beyond that which has traditionally been practiced in most law 
enforcement agencies.  It requires the exploitation of all pertinent 
information and the analyst must be prepared to go beyond traditional 
sources such as police files to other government and regulatory agencies, 
private databases, and open sources.  The current proliferation of 
information sources through media like the Internet has increased the 
resources available to analysts by several orders of magnitude, meaning 
they must work to a much higher standard than was acceptable ten, or 
even, five years ago.95   
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Several software applications are currently available to assist with this process.  
Many have robust search engines with data mining and social networking capabilities.   
Dissemination requires that properly analyzed intelligence is sent to those who 
have the need and right to know.  Intelligence that is not properly disseminated might as 
well be nonexistent.96   Although there are specific reasons that some information must 
be kept confidential, every effort must be taken to get intelligence to those who need it.  
In the Enterprise Policing Model, the mantra is not, “Who has a need to know?”  Rather, 
it is, “Who else has a need to know?”             
“Reevaluation is the task of examining intelligence products to determine their 
effectiveness.  Part of this assessment comes from the consumers of intelligence; that is, 
the managers, investigators, and officers to whom the intelligence is directed.”97   
Requesting feedback from those to whom intelligence is disseminated is one of the best 
ways to accomplish this task.98   The goal of reevaluation is increased precision of data 
collection and improved utility of intelligence products. 
Effective processing of intelligence is an important component of Enterprise 
Policing.  It is helpful for the reader to understand the history of law enforcement 
intelligence so that past errors are not repeated.  Early attempts by police departments to 
create intelligence units date back to the 1920s when some agencies began keeping files 
on bootleggers and high-profile criminals such as Al Capone, Bonnie and Clyde, and 
others.  By the 1940s, the Red Scare emerged in the United States and the police agencies 
turned their intelligence efforts into creating dossiers on suspected Communists and their 
sympathizers.  Although the people included in what became known as “Red Files” had 
not committed any crimes and were merely exercising their constitutional rights to free 
speech, they were believed to be a national security threat.  
During the 1960s, participants in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War 
movements were regarded by some as threats to public safety.  Police agencies responded 
by adding individual leaders of these groups to their dossiers.  This would later prove to 
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be an error in judgment, as the claims that activists and protesters threatened public safety 
were largely unsupported.  Misuse of the intelligence process led to mistrust of police 
agencies.  
There was additional concern during this time because of the activist 
nature of the U.S. Supreme Court during the era of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren (1953-1968).  Many of the liberal decisions of the Warren Court 
were met with disfavor and the often-expressed belief that the Court’s 
decisions were “handcuffing the police.”   (Among the most often cited 
are Miranda v. Arizona – police must advise arrestees of their fifth and 
sixth Amendment rights prior to a custodial interrogation; Mapp v. Ohio – 
applying the Exclusionary Rule to states; Gideon v. Wainwright – right to 
an appointed counsel; and Escobedo v. Illinois – right to counsel when the 
process shifts from investigatory to accusatory.)  With regard to the 
current discussion, perhaps most important was that the Warren Court led 
a generation of judicial activism and expanded interpretations of the 
Constitution.  Moreover, it symbiotically motivated activist attorneys from 
the 1960s to try new strategies for the protection of constitutional rights.  
Among the most successful was reliance on a little-used provision of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 
1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Civil Rights.  
Commonly referred to as 1983 suits, this provision essentially provides 
that anyone who, under color of state or local law, causes a person to be 
deprived of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or federal law may 
be civilly liable.99 
 
Although these suits were initially used for various allegations of police 
misconduct, such as excessive force and due process violations, they began to focus on 
police intelligence units by the 1970s.  The practice of keeping files on people who 
“might” commit a crime was deemed improper and police agencies had to pay for the 
damages to the plaintiffs in these cases.  This resulted in significant cutbacks or removal 
of intelligence units in many American police departments.100    
Obviously, the intelligence units of the past have no resemblance to the needs of 
today.  There were no protocols for the types of information that could be collected, no 
analysis done, and no concern given to proper dissemination.  The information certainly 
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wasn’t used for any sort of strategic purposes or for the investigation of complex, 
transnational issues that challenge today’s police departments.  
Currently, “Strategic analysis has not been widely adopted in the United States.  
Law enforcement agencies have been slow to use it with the exception of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshall’s Service, and a few others.  Instead, 
American law enforcement has been primarily reactive; tied to responding to crimes that 
have already been committed. . . .  Even in the community oriented policing model, 
proactive policing is seldom used.”101  The threat to public safety posed by terrorism 
simply does not allow for such a reactive approach. 
“The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed the life-and-death 
importance of enhancing U.S. intelligence operations.  Since that day, a tremendous 
amount of attention has been focused on the need for constructing changes in law 
enforcement intelligence.”102  Although most of the efforts to reorganize the intelligence 
architecture in America have focused on federal agencies, there exists a corresponding 
need to address the same issues in local law enforcement agencies.  Obviously, not all 
police departments in America are large enough to warrant a separate intelligence unit, 
but, at a minimum, all law enforcement agencies “. . . must have the ability to effectively 
consume the information and intelligence products being shared by a wide range of 
organizations at all levels of government.  State, local, and tribal law enforcement will be 
most effective when a single source in every agency is the conduit of critical information. 
. . . ”103   Such a source is a requirement of the Enterprise Policing model.  
In large, urban areas, this source could be a regional fusion center.   In smaller 
cities, it may be a patrol sergeant who is assigned the task.  “Hence, every law 
enforcement agency must have an understanding of its intelligence management 
capabilities regardless of its size or organizational structure.”104   
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C. NETWORKING  
Closely related to the concept of information sharing is networking.  This is not 
something that police agencies have done very well in the past.  In fact, police officers 
are known more for keeping secrets than for sharing information.  This sort of practice 
leads to what University of Houston Professor Steven A. Egger has termed “linkage 
blindness.”  In his research of serial murderers in America, Dr. Egger found that many 
clues are missed and many crimes go unsolved because the police investigators suffer 
from linkage blindness, a failure to share or coordinate investigative information and a 
lack of adequate networking among law enforcement officers in America.   
Linkage blindness occurs for three reasons.  One is because police officers simply 
do not want to share information with other police officers.  Competition, jealousy, 
mistrust, and a desire to solve the big case all lead to their refusal to share with others.  
They will tell their spouses about a case; they will discuss it with their friends over a 
drink, but they will not tell another cop what they know. 
The second reason linkage blindness occurs is because of the decentralized non-
system of policing in America.  The country is made up of thousands of police agencies 
that are concerned only with what happens within the boundaries of their local 
jurisdictions.  The sharing of information across those boundaries is non-existent.  The 
third reason is because most police departments lack the technology to properly analyze 
the data available to them so that it can be placed into some sort of a meaningful form for 
sharing.105  The result is systematic myopia and it is clearly detrimental to the 
identification and solution of complex transnational crimes.  
The information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the 
spectrum.  Of the many reasons for this, we call attention to two in 
particular.  First, the information revolution is favoring and strengthening 
network forms of organizations, often giving them an advantage over 
hierarchical forms.  The rise of networks means that power is migrating to 
nonstate actors who are able to organize into sprawling, multi-
organizational networks more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, 
state actors.  Second, as the information revolution deepens, conflicts will 
increasingly depend on information and communications matters.106 
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The Enterprise Policing model recognizes that “Governments that would defend 
against netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their 
adversaries.  This does not mean mirroring the adversary, but rather learning to draw on 
the same design principles of network forms in the information age.  These principles 
depend to some extent upon technological innovation, but mainly on a willingness to 
innovate organizationally and doctrinally, and by building new mechanisms for 
interagency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation. 
Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages.  In 
these early decades of the information age, adversaries who have adopted networking (be 
they criminals, terrorists or peaceful social activists) are enjoying an increase in their 
power relative to state agencies.”107 
An imperative of Enterprise Policing is that departments develop cooperative 
relationships with community groups and with other agencies.  Those relationships must 
include effective networking.  In order to thrive in the post 9/11 era, intelligence sharing 
is critical.   The 9/11 Commission Report has confirmed that, “There is a growing role for 
state and local law enforcement agencies.  They need more training and work with 
federal agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities 
in identifying terrorist suspects.”108   Such cooperative relationships will require police 
agencies to network with law enforcement and intelligence agencies in unprecedented 
ways.  “The network designed for sharing information, and the work of the FBI through 
local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, should build a reciprocal relationship in which state 
and local agents understand what information they are looking for and, in return, receive 
some of the information being developed about what is happening, or may happen, in 
their communities.”109   
In many cases, Enterprise Policing will involve networking with agencies that did 
not even exist prior to September 11, 2001.  Networking with the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force is one example.  Others include The Homeland Security Department and statewide 
counter terrorism agencies that have been created since the 9/11 attacks.   Members of the 
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intelligence unit in the Naperville, Illinois Police Department have developed networks 
with a wide variety of other intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  The following 




Figure 2. Naperville Police Department Networks  
 
Another example of networking can be found in a national police benchmarking 
survey.  The Benchmark City Survey was originally designed in 1997 by a core group of 
police chiefs representing various sectors of the country.  These chiefs led agencies that 
were somewhat similar in size and demographics.  Most of the departments involved in 





to 250,000.  These chiefs sought to establish a measurement tool to determine best 
practices and to help ensure that their departments were providing the best possible 
service to their communities. 
The survey provides a wide range of comparative information about each of the 
departments.  Each year since 1997, the Overland Park, Kansas Police Department has 
taken the lead in compiling the survey results and making them available at an annual 
chiefs’ summit hosted by the participating agencies on a rotating basis.  This is an 
excellent example of how police agencies can share information with each other about 
“what works.”  The 2004 Benchmark City Survey is 257 pages long and can be viewed 
online at:  http://www.opkansas.org/_Res/Police_and_Fire/Police_Department/benchmark.cfm. 
The idea of creating information networks goes beyond working with other law 
enforcement agencies.  For most departments, it means developing new relationships 
with the corporations and businesses in their communities.   David J. Rothkopf, CEO of 
Intellibridge Corporation explains the necessity for public-private networking as follows: 
Only a new kind of alliance can win the war on terrorism.  This alliance 
will not be one between nations nor will it be bounded by a treaty.  
Instead, it will be unconventional, involve millions of disparate actors, and 
be guided by rules that will be constantly rewritten.  It will be an alliance 
of a motley army of horizontal partnerships, with a non-traditional 
leadership structure.  Its best troops will be regiments of geeks rather than 
the Special Forces that struck the first blows against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. . . . 
The members of this fighting force are scientists and doctors, venture 
capitalists and corporate project managers – the private-sector army that is 
the United States’ not-so-secret weapon and best hope.  These unlikely 
warriors will provide the software, systems and analytical resources that 
will enable the United States to track terrorists.110 
Developing alliances and networks with private-sector agencies is mandatory for 
the Enterprise Policing agency.  Police agencies that fail in their efforts to develop 
networks and information sharing capabilities with other government and private-sector 
agencies might find themselves suffering from linkage blindness.  The lack of networking 
and information sharing can result in failure to predict terrorist activity.  
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D. NEW ADAPTATIONS OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
Some suggest that the community policing era is over and others have even stated 
that the precepts of community policing are inconsistent with what is going to be required 
in the homeland security era.  The concerns mentioned about the future of community 
policing are valid.  However, community policing did not fail on September 11, 2001.  
The manner in which it has been adopted by many agencies failed, and that failure 
threatens the very future of community policing:  
This threat has nothing to do with budgets, unions, politicians, reticent 
officers or citizens, drug wars, or terrorism.  It is a much less engaging 
issue than any of these concerns, in part because it is virtually invisible.  
Even when the culprit is detected, it is hard to make headlines from 
material as dry as ‘the failure to complete the implementation process.’  
And yet the failure to institutionalize changes that represent commitments 
to community policing is a killer as deadly as it is silent.  The murder will 
be committed so stealthily that it will remain undetected long after the 
corpse of community policing is tossed – without benefit of a memorial 
service – onto the large bone pile of splendid but decaying new ideas.  
Chiefs may still proclaim that their organizations are community policing 
organizations even though the newest officers may have no idea what that 
means.  Unless it is institutionalized, community policing can slip 
unobserved into history.111  
In the proposed Enterprise Policing model, community policing is not only 
consistent with homeland security needs, it is a requirement.  The precepts of a strong, 
institutionalized community policing model form the very foundation of Enterprise 
Policing.  Former Arlington County Police Chief Edward A. Flynn was among the first 
responders to the attack on the Pentagon on September 11.  He has stated, “Community 
policing is now more important than ever.  After September 11, 2001, homeland security 
issues (preparing and responding to terrorist acts as well as community stabilization) 
became law enforcement’s primary focus.  Although terrorists may ‘think globally,’ they 
‘act locally. . . .’  Through the many briefings on resource allocations, new technologies, 
interoperability, and other plans to counter the new terrorist threats, I remain convinced 
that one of the greatest weapons against terrorists is community policing.”112   
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During the previously mentioned 2002 intelligence summit that was hosted by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, a national strategy for improving 
intelligence gathering was outlined.  “It discusses how community policing initiatives can 
aid in the gathering of locally driven intelligence.  Line officers, closer to the community 
and with more immediate access to information than others, can help gather intelligence 
data needed to disrupt terrorists’ preparations.  The summit report discusses how 
thousands of communities policing officers have been building close and productive 
relationships with citizens – relationships directly related to information and intelligence 
sharing.  Consequently, rather than undermining community policing, the current and 
urgent need for timely and accurate threat information becomes a natural integrator by 
taking advantage of mechanisms already in place.”113    
This view is reinforced by retired chief of police and director of the New 
Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council, Earl M. Sweeney, who views the 
local patrol officer as an untapped source of intelligence on terrorists and potential 
terrorist acts.  “While conducting their daily activities, such as foot, vehicle, and bicycle 
patrol; community policing efforts; traffic stops; accident investigations; and answering 
routine calls for service, these officers are already accepted by their communities and, 
therefore, can become America’s intelligence on the ground.”114      
Writing for the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Darrel W. 
Stephens and Francis X. Hartmann cite “ . . . the value of developing relationships with 
stakeholder groups that are potential targets of terrorist acts while also engaging citizens 
in activities that deter criminal acts and decrease fear.  These relationships evolve from a 
foundation of problem-solving partnerships that have been the life-blood of community 
policing’s prevention orientation.”115  One of eight recommendations by Stephens and 
Hartmann was to use community policing skills to help departments rethink the meaning 
of the threat of terrorism for local law enforcement.  Community policing must evolve in 
response to changes in the current environment, in which terrorism is a constant threat.  
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Local agencies must be resilient and enterprising in adapting response mechanisms.  In 
addition, training programs must evolve to increase awareness of issues critical to 
homeland security. 
True community policing that is not just a superficial public relations program can 
be the critical foundation of an enterprise policing model.  Adaptations of community 
policing for the new model include creations of partnerships with the Muslim 
community.  On September 10, 2005, I interviewed Kareem Irfan, a prominent national 
spokesman for the Islamic community.  The following is a summary of that interview.    
In 1980, Kareem Irfan was a senior engineering student in a university in his 
native homeland of India.  He had no idea that his future would bring meetings with 
American police chiefs, high ranking officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and officials from the State Department of the United States of America.  His father had 
made several trips to the United States and became aware of the opportunities available 
for his family, including advanced education for Kareem.  In 1981, he convinced his 
family to migrate and Kareem found himself in the Chicago area.  He quickly enrolled in 
the University of Illinois and began working on a master’s degree in computer 
engineering; his goal was a career with IBM.        
During the mid-1980s, a court decision was handed down enabling patents to be 
placed on computer software.  As a result of that decision, a Chicago law firm saw a need 
for lawyers who had knowledge of computer engineering.  Mr. Irfan and other 
engineering students were recruited by the firm to obtain law degrees.  Mr. Irfan accepted 
the challenge and received a law degree from DePaul University in 1989.  He became a 
lawyer and an assistant general counsel for a multi-national company.  His expertise and 
education made him well suited for future challenges. 
During his childhood, Mr. Irfan’s father instilled in him the importance of giving 
to others.  His father’s words, “Anyone can make a living for himself.  You must live to 
provide for others,” compelled Mr. Irfan to join the Council of Islamic Organizations of 
Greater Chicago (CIOGC).  The CIOGC is an active and highly functional umbrella 
organization representing over 400,000 Muslims who are members of approximately 90 
different mosques, Islamic organizations, schools, and civil rights groups in the Chicago 
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region.  Initially, Mr. Irfan assisted members of the organization with various legal 
issues, such as the drafting of wills.  He also found that racism by police against Muslims 
was perceived as a common issue and he began speaking out against it. 
On January 5, 2001, Mr. Irfan became the youngest person ever to be elected as 
chairman of the CIOGC.  In that role, he became concerned about the increasing tension 
between Muslim communities and federal agencies.  He began communicating with the 
government in an attempt to dissipate misunderstandings.  His mission changed abruptly 
on the morning of September 11, 2001.  There was an immediate backlash against the 
Muslim community.  In an appeal for calm, Mr. Irfan took the next two weeks off, 
denouncing terrorism, speaking out on radio talk shows, and drafting a newsletter 
explaining that extremist terrorists did not represent mainstream Muslim views.   
September 11, 2001, created a new interdependence between law enforcement 
and the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities in America.  The communities needed law 
enforcement’s protection against a surge of hate crimes and backlash violence.  Likewise, 
law enforcement needed the trust of these communities and their cooperation to prevent 
another terrorist attack and to protect them from hate crimes and backlash violence. 
Two events that followed would impact on police-community relations.  The first 
event was the government closure and asset seizure of three major Islamic charities.  Two 
of those charities were based in the Chicago area and their assets were seized during the 
last days of Ramadan.  This was immediately following the annual obligatory donations 
to charities made by area Muslims.  The government actions against the charitable 
organizations and the timing of those actions served to drive a further wedge between the 
government and the Islamic communities at a time when they needed each other the 
most.  The national preeminence of these charities, the seemingly new investigative and 
legal techniques used to shut them down, the inability or unwillingness of authorities to 
publicly share incriminating evidence, and the obligation of all practicing Muslims to 
give to charity, all served to heighten fear and concern in the Muslim community 
throughout America 
The second event came just a few months after September 11, when the 
Department of Justice announced, “. . . a new role for local police agencies:  helping 
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federal agents to identify and question large numbers of non-criminal immigrants.  The 
department did not suspect the immigrants – all young men from Middle Eastern 
countries – of terrorism.  In fact, it did not suspect them of any crime at all.  Rather, given 
their demographic similarity to the September 11 hijackers, the department thought that 
the men might know something – even things they did not realize were important – that 
might produce leads or otherwise assist in preventing and investigating terrorism.”116  
This request from the Justice Department troubled not only the immigrant groups, but 
also many in the local law enforcement community who realized the negative impact 
such actions could have on police-immigrant relations.  This questioning resulted in little, 
if any, actionable intelligence.  In fact, it had the unintended consequences of breaking 
down trust between the Islamic community and law enforcement.  
In addition to his position on the CIOGC, Mr. Irfan is a member of the National 
Board of the Islamic Society of North America.  Kareem had spent much of his time 
immediately following the September 11 attacks working with the media to help counter 
any negative perceptions of Islam or the Chicago area Muslim community.  He followed 
up those efforts by contacting the special agent in charge of the Chicago office of the 
FBI, the superintendent of the Chicago police department, numerous other police leaders 
in the Chicago area, the director of the Police Executive Research Forum, and chief 
executive members of Fortune 500 companies.  He has also been to Washington DC to 
address the State department about the erosion of civil rights in the Islamic community.  
He feels passionately that government and the community must have a symbiotic, not an 
antagonistic relationship and has taken many positives steps to achieve that goal.  
Mr. Irfan has written articles for the Police Executive Research Forum.  His most 
recent endeavor has been the creation of a brochure that has been disseminated nationally 
by the Islamic Society of North America.  Against Terrorism and Religious Extremism:  
Muslim Position and Responsibilities can be downloaded and viewed at 
www.balancedislam.org.  This brochure was designed to clarify a few key issues 
regarding terrorism and Islamic beliefs.  It includes an unequivocal condemnation of 
terrorism by stating, “Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of 
violence against innocent lives.  There is no justification in Islam for extremism or 
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terrorism.”   Mr. Irfan clearly recognizes the need for a symbiotic rather than an 
antagonistic relationship between law enforcement and the Muslim community.117  
It is important to remember that, “American Muslims not only become citizens – 
they become good citizens.  Despite the assimilation hurdles that face every new group of 
immigrants, our Muslims have opportunities and hope.  A disaffected few make 
headlines, but American Muslims overwhelmingly support their new country and do not 
wish it harm.  They see no contradiction between faith in their god and faith in America.  
Our worries are their worries and their dreams are our dreams.”118   
Enterprise Policing is designed to address the concerns of Kareem Irfan and 
others in the Muslim community, as well as other crucial issues such as fear management.  
The management of fear generated by terrorism in the community can be very different 
and far more difficult than helping communities cope with the fear of crime.  The 
reaction of Americans throughout the country to the attacks of 9/11 is a testament to just 
how great the impact of terrorism can be.  Immediately after the attacks, a tremendous 
negative impact on the American economy resulted from people who refused to fly on 
airplanes and lead what had been normal lives.  It is important for the police executive to 
understand how this fear is fueled and what steps can be taken to alleviate it. 
Dr. James Breckenridge and Dr. Philip Zimbardo have noted that the media in 
America typically focuses on negative stories that generate fear in the minds of the 
public. Such reporting by the media plays very well with terrorists, whose goal is to 
spread fear and intimidate far beyond the immediate target of an attack.  “Terrorists 
appear to have a keen, intuitive appreciation of psychological mechanisms that spread the 
effects of terror well beyond primary victims and amplify the perception of risk and 
vulnerability far out of proportion to reasonable probabilities.  Modern terrorism is 
necessarily mass-mediated political violence, and the media plays a critical role in 
facilitating the psychological processes that intensify the publics’ fears and 
apprehensions.”119 
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Bruce Hoffman echoes this view.  “The modern news media as the principal 
conduit of information about such acts thus play a vital part in the terrorists’ calculus.  
Indeed, without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is arguably wasted, remaining 
narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack rather than reaching the wider 
‘target audience’ at whom the terrorists’ violence is actually aimed.”120  In a stinging 
example of the media’s capitulation to the terrorists, Hoffman wrote this about the 
coverage of the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, “The cloying and meretricious 
content of the reporting was clearly revealed in a contemporary Washington Post article.  
‘In the race for on-the-air scoops, which ABC-TV News seems to have won to date,’ it 
began, ‘the interview Friday morning between anchorman [news presenter] Dan Rather 
of “CBS Evening News” and TWA flight 847’s hostage media star, Allyn Conwell, was 
distinctive.’  In possibly the most egregious perversion of news reporting during this 
episode, the ‘news presenters’ rather than the ‘news makers’ became the story!”121 
In New Glory, Ralph Peters explains the issues with the media as follows:  “The 
media can no longer sustain their pretenses of being aloof, objective observers 
dispassionately recording events.  The media are combatants.  Their cameras may not 
slay directly, but their reporting can now change the outcome of battles and alter the 
course of campaigns . . .  Our own media’s capacity to damage our struggle for freedom 
and security lies in their appetite for sensation, their lack of context, and their 
partisanship.”122 
From a law enforcement perspective, the disproportionate fear that is created in 
the minds of the public can be counterproductive to public safety.  That fear, coupled 
with a cynical distrust of government can hamper compliance with security instructions 
during a time of crisis.  Moreover, public fear generated by the mass-media can lead to 
misguided policy priorities.  Since government actions frequently coincide with public 
opinion polls that can be driven by disproportionate fear, the resultant government policy 
may not be the most effective to ensure public safety. For example, the overwhelming 
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks has been the creation of an airline passenger  
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screening program.  Yet, there have been only eight terrorist attacks on airplanes 
(including the September 11 attacks) that have resulted in deaths to Americans during the 
last 35 years. 123  
Another concern for police is the portrayal of terrorists as “madmen.”  There are 
two issues with such a portrayal.  First, such a portrayal only adds fuel to the flame of 
fear and second, it is simply not accurate.  “Terrorists are not irrational.  Some of them, 
however, operate in an introverted, closed universe and may have a high tolerance for 
what an outsider would see as drastic conflicts between their professed beliefs about the 
world and obvious facts.”124       
An effective and appropriate law enforcement response to this problem can be 
challenging. Police managers must recognize that “Mass media’s preference for 
controversy over scientific subtleties and careful exposition of risks can not only elevate 
the publics’ sense of danger and vulnerability, it can limit the publics’ understanding of 
the enemy.”125  Breckenridge and Zimbardo offer these common sense suggestions: 
• Provide full information that speaks to local concerns.  This includes 
stressing realistic probabilities along with risk alerts.   
• Plan for realistic psychological reactions.  This means that efforts should 
be directed toward planning for probable scenarios rather than unlikely events. 
• Stress preparation and training.  This is an area where law enforcement 
has an opportunity to generate public trust and mitigate public fear.  Pre-event 
activities that include simulations and exercises that test response capabilities can 
be used to educate the public and to enlist their support. 
• Use scientifically credible risk communication. This provides another 
opportunity for police to garner public trust and to create positive relations with 
the media.  Care must be taken not to place any sort of political spin or to obscure 
information in any way.  Providing accurate, well thought out information can 
create the ever important public trust in the competency of government. 
• Exercise particular care with warnings.  Warnings should be coupled with 
implicit information about government preparedness as well as detailed 
instructions for concerned citizens. 
• Anticipate the needs of special populations.  Some members of the public, 
such as children or certain ethnic groups, may have vulnerabilities that are 
specific to them.  Pre-planned school disaster response plans and response plans 
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for mosques and synagogues are examples of things that can be done to minimize 
fear in these groups. 
• Take advantage of technological communication resources. Internet 
resources can be utilized to rebut misinformation and urban legends that may be 
passed around.126                                  
Although difficult to implement, fear management practices can be more easily 
addressed in communities that have close ties with their police departments than in those 
that do not.   The Enterprise Policing model mandates such a relationship between the 
police department and the community.  
 
E. TECHNOLOGY  
Interoperable data sharing and communications systems represent critical 
technology needs for most police departments.      
The lack of interoperability is a serious, pressing public safety problem 
that severely undermines the capacities of law enforcement, firefighters, 
and other first responders to respond to and manage emergency situations.  
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the urgent 
need for public safety and other agencies to communicate reliably and 
effectively with each other when called upon in a crisis. 
There are five challenges public officials must address to achieve interoperability: 
1. Incompatible and aging communications equipment; 
2. Limited and fragmented funding; 
3. Limited and fragmented planning; 
4. Lack of coordination and cooperation; and 
5. Limited and fragmented radio spectrum.127 
 
Currently, there are gang files, terrorism “watch lists,” and drug data bases 
maintained by many states that cannot be shared with other states.  “In addition, there are 
deficiencies in the communications systems used by municipalities throughout the 
country.  If an attack were to occur today, most state and local first responders would not 
be using compatible communications equipment. . . .  This lack of interoperability was 
                                                 
126 Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism, 28-32. 
127Erin Lee, Strategies for States to Achieve Public Safety Wireless Interoperability (Washington, D.C.: 
NGA Center for Best Practices, 2003), 1.  
 51
evident many times over the last decade – during the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1999 Columbine school shootings, and the 
September 11 attacks.”128  
Developing an interoperable communications system can be a difficult and 
expensive challenge for any police administrator.  To be successful, the hiring of a 
consultant and joint planning and purchasing with other agencies is frequently necessary.    
In radio communications, interoperability is the complex problem of 
unifying legacy systems spread across frequency bands and myriad 
geographic locations, each of which uses unique operating procedures.  
Many public safety organizations have begun to coordinate with each 
other to ensure compatibility in hardware purchases, the use of radio-
frequency spectrums, and operational planning.  Standards are also in 
place to decrease the number of unique, proprietary solutions.129    
SAFECOM can be a source of significant help to any agency considering an 
interoperability project.  SAFECOM is a national program, managed by the Department 
of Homeland Security, which oversees all public safety communications and 
interoperability projects.  SAFECOM promotes coordination and cooperation between 
different agencies and across all levels of government.   To illustrate this, SAFECOM has 
developed an Interoperability Continuum that consists of five interdependent elements: 
1. Governance. 
2. Standard Operating Procedures. 
3. Technology. 
4. Training and Exercises. 
5. Usage. 
Progress along all five elements should be considered simultaneously.130   A 
template demonstrating how this continuum can be used was developed by SAFECOM 
and can be viewed on line at www.safecomprogram.gov.   
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Technology alone will not solve the interoperability problem.  Any interoperable 
architecture and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) must be clearly 
linked.  The system development and NIMS protocols require training, standard 
operating procedures, and governance.  Networking with other agencies is crucial to any 
interoperable system.  For example, whenever communications system changes are made, 
it is critical to involve other agencies throughout the region to ensure success of any 
interoperable effort.  Joint training exercises must be conducted.  The contrast between 
agencies that form networks and those that do not is obvious in the following quote:   
On September 11, 2001, the Arlington County, Virginia, Emergency 
Communications Center (ECC) requested the response and assistance of 
50 local, state, and federal public-safety agencies by invoking two 
preestablished mutual aid plans.  Because of these prior interagency 
operational agreements, responders from one jurisdiction were able to 
operate on other public-safety radio systems. . . .   In contrast, to the World 
Trade Center response, where little or no event planning had taken place, 
the relative success of the Pentagon response was due in large part to 
interagency planning and agreements. 131   
 
F. TRAINING 
The acquisition of new technology brings with it the need for additional training.  
A key element in the evolution of community policing to the Enterprise Policing model is 
training.  “. . . There is a need to ensure that all police personnel – including line 
personnel, executives, and policy makers – receive necessary training to make certain 
they have the tools to effectively respond.  Key areas of need have recently surfaced, 
such as conducting threat assessments, identifying people who may be involved in 
terrorist activities, and technology and information management.”132     
The institutionalization of community policing begins with training and leader 
commitment. Currently, community policing training is conducted at academies and 
seminars as though it were some sort of a specialized skill that officers should have, like 
criminal investigation and traffic enforcement.  Then, to implement this style of policing, 
departments respond by creating community policing units or identifying certain officers 
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as community policing officers within their departments.  This typically results when a 
police chief sees community policing as a program rather than a philosophy.   Whenever 
anything new is implemented in the department such as a police bicycle program, the 
chief proudly boasts to the citizens that his department is “community policing.”     Quite 
simply, such practices impair the effectiveness of the partnerships and limit the 
possibilities of what can be accomplished by an agency that truly instills community 
policing concepts in all of its employees as the way to conduct business.   
There are ways to better guide agencies and enable them to become more 
effective in this model.  The RAND Public Safety and Justice unit has conducted research 
into the training problems currently faced by the Los Angeles Police Department and has 
made recommendations for change that hold promise for other police departments 
throughout our country.   In the LAPD study, RAND noted that currently, leadership and 
vision are lacking; there is no coherency to training messages, and there is no consistency 
in implementation.  The study went on the note, “Initial classroom observations indicated 
an absence of a unifying theme for officer development. Focus group sessions with 
probationers, field training officers and other personnel corroborated this finding.  
Finally, individual interviews pointed to a struggle in developing a consistent leadership 
vision for the Department (partly, and understandably, due to administrative changes).  
That the LAPD does not communicate a unified message creates a dangerous vacuum 
that individual officers fill with their own interpretations of proper behavior.”133   The 
same can be said about many police agencies throughout our country.    
Officers need to receive a consistent message from the training, especially now 
that terrorism is a threat.  They must understand their role as community leaders and 
representatives of the government.  They must be taught to realize the very critical 
importance of engendering trust and respect from the communities they serve, and they 
must also realize that they are a crucial element in the prevention of terrorism as well as 
traditional crime. They cannot effectively meet their responsibilities without receiving 
critical information that comes from their daily contacts with citizens.  Police officers 
who do not have good relationships with their communities will not garner the 
information necessary to be effective.     
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The study recommends that the future training of police officers be directed 
toward the development of “professionals.”   Training that includes clear direction 
regarding the values and standards of the department will result in strong common bonds 
and a shared sense of social responsibility.  Officers will have a corporate identity and 
will be more likely to elicit and share critical information.134 
The community policing philosophy must be imbued in each officer.  A keen 
understanding of diversity awareness is also necessary.135   Once they become more 
competent in this area, they will find that they are more proficient in their role as crime 
fighters.  The partnerships that form as a result of better communication with a diverse 
population may result in the development of relevant information about possible terrorist 
sleeper cells.  
Finally, the officers must glean expertise in the area of coercion.  Political 
scientist William Ker Muir noted, “. . . that good police officers are masters of legal 
coercion:  the art and science of marshaling the authority of their office and their own 
personal powers to get other people to behave in ways the police define as 
appropriate.”136   Police officers who are skillful at coercion will instill trust in their 
communities.  That community trust will extend to their departments and the law 
enforcement profession.   Conversely, officers who fail in this arena discredit themselves 
and drive a wedge between their organizations and their partners in crime prevention, 
their communities 
Community policing should be taught as an organizational value, like integrity, 
rather than a skill, like criminal investigations.  By synchronizing the current “stovepipe” 
method of training, i.e. 16 hours of search and seizure, 24 hours of community policing, 
and 32 hours of use of force into a value based training program that leads to the 
development of police professionals, police departments can become even more effective 
dealing with traditional crime and in the development of sources who can provide 
valuable information in the prevention of terrorism.  A value based training program lead 
                                                 
134 Brannan, et al., Training the 21st Century, 37. 
135 Ibid., 91. 
136 Ibid., 119.  
 55
to significant improvements in law enforcement’s human intelligence capabilities and 
networking efforts.  This establishes the framework of the Enterprise Policing model. 
 
G. RESILIENCY 
On March 17, 2000, lightning struck an industrial building in New Mexico and 
started a small fire, which was quickly extinguished by fire units.  There were no injuries 
and, at first, the damage seemed insignificant.  However, it was soon disclosed that the 
building was a semiconductor fabrication plant and that it was required to be absolutely 
clean since even the smallest spec of soot could ruin the delicate microscopic circuits 
inside.  To make matters worse, it was learned that smoke had spread throughout the 
facility, damaging millions of microchips produced for shipment to Nokia in Finland and 
Ericcson in Amsterdam. 
Representatives of both Nokia and Ericcson were immediately notified of the fire 
and advised that it would probably result in about a one-week delay in shipment.  
Although it was not initially viewed as a significant issue, the Nokia representative 
immediately passed this news along to others in his organization and Nokia responded by 
sending two engineers to New Mexico to assist in the recovery effort.  Within the next 
two weeks, Nokia learned that the plant restoration efforts would take several weeks and 
that the microchip production schedule would be delayed by several months.   
Realizing that the disrupted supplies would delay the production of millions of 
cell phones, Nokia sent 30 officials throughout Europe, Asia and the United States to get 
commitments for the delivery of the microchips.  As a result of Nokia’s outstanding 
internal communications, quick response, and collaboration with others, they were able to 
continue supplying cell phones to their customers.   
The story was quite different at Ericcson.  When the initial phone call about the 
fire was received by an Ericcson representative, the news was received as a minor 
problem and was not communicated to any of the company bosses.  By the time the 
seriousness of the problem was understood, Nokia already had commitments for all of the 
other available cell phone microchips.    As  a  result of Ericcson’s inability to acquire the  
necessary parts to produce cell phones, they lost millions of customers and, within one 
year, Ericcson was forced to give up a significant part of its company and go into a joint 
venture with Sony. 
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Although Nokia and Ericcson were both faced with the same catastrophic 
disruption, Nokia’s culture of organizational communication, immediate action, and 
collaborative efforts with others helped them recover and Ericcson’s idleness resulted in a 
loss of a portion of their company.137  
The importance of building an organizational culture that encourages effective 
communications is another significant part of Enterprise Policing.  Another significant 
aspect of organizational resiliency is detecting disruptions.  The following is an example 
of when that did not occur.   
In the case of 9/11, there is no single identifiable moment one can point to 
and say “this is when the U.S. government knew about the terrorist 
attacks.”  Instead, all that can be said is that different parts of the 
government knew different facts at different times and only after 
accumulation enough facts did enough of the government know enough 
information about the events to take action.  In fact, when told of the 
attack on the morning of 9/11, U.S. president George W. Bush did not 
immediately internalize the meaning of the news and famously kept 
reading stories to children for seven more minutes. 
Even before the attack itself, and regardless of all of the events that were 
its precursors, the U.S. 9/11 commission has found out that the U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration officials received 52 warnings prior to 
September 11, 2001, from their own security experts about potential al-
Qaida  attacks, including some that mentioned airline hijackings or suicide 
attacks.  The report comments that aviation officials were “lulled into a 
false sense of security” and “intelligence that indicated a real and growing 
threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant increases in security 
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H. STRATEGY CANVAS   
A strategy canvas is a graph that depicts an analytical comparison of 
organizational strategies.139 The following strategy canvas compares community policing 
with those of Enterprise Policing to provide the reader with a quick view of these two 
models.  The horizontal axis captures the six strategic factors being compared and the 
vertical axis captures the relative state of how the two policing models implement these 
strategies.   
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V. CONCLUSION  
Now, perhaps more than anytime in its history, America needs competent law 
enforcement agencies with sophisticated crime fighting capabilities.  Transnational crime 
and terrorism threaten the American lifestyle and, to some extent, our existence. This 
thesis has explored the new role for American police agencies that has been created by 
the events of September 11.  An evolution from a community policing environment to a 
model identified as Enterprise Policing has been proposed as an effective way for police 
agencies to meet the challenges they currently face.  To meet those challenges, police 
chiefs throughout the country are being faced with the need to change their organizations 
in significant ways.  
Whether they have adopted the concepts of Homeland Security by force 
(e.g., New York City; Arlington County, Virginia; Washington, D.C.), by 
local circumstances (e.g., San Francisco, Chicago, Houston), by lure of 
grant dollars (e.g., City of Pine Bluff Police Department, Arkansas; Town 
of Kittery Police Department, Maine; Casper Police Department, WY), by 
state directive, or simply by local government and citizen demand, police 
agencies are beginning to wrestle with what Homeland Security means to 
their particular agencies.  As one author has stated, “What is the role of 
state and local law enforcement in a post-September 11 environment?”140   
Some of the changes suggested will cost money and may take a period of years to 
complete.  Many, such as the development of interoperable communications systems will 
require coordination and support from other agencies.  Others may require a significant 
paradigm change from current practices in police agencies. 
One change that requires immediate attention is improvement in the exchange of 
information between officers within the same agency and between different law 
enforcement agencies.  The sad part about this recommendation is that it is far from new.  
In fact, inter-organizational relations between criminal justice agencies were identified as 
important policy issues in three separate national commission reports during the 1960s 
and 1970s: 
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• In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice recommended more cooperation between agencies at 
the local level. 
• In 1969, the National Commission of the Cause and Prevention of 
Violence called for local jurisdictions to establish criminal justice coordinating 
councils. 
• In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals acclaimed those local areas that had adopted local criminal justice 
councils, and then further recommended that all major metropolitan areas 
consider adopting this criminal justice linkage model.141 
Two flagrant examples of law enforcement’s failure to share information between 
agencies were cited by Dr. Egger as examples of linkage blindness: 
The Bundy and Lucas cases provide some examples of local and state 
agencies not sharing information or assisting on another.  In the Bundy 
case, there were numerous examples of sharing across local and state 
jurisdictions.  However, there were at least two instances of a refusal to 
share information, seek assistance from another agency, or cooperate with 
an investigation.  The Lucas case illustrates the lack of sharing or 
coordination on a large scale, across numerous state as well as local 
jurisdictions.  The difference here is that no patterns were identified to 
require interagency or interstate cooperation.  However, the lack of such 
cooperation or a mechanism with which to communicate means that the 
patterns, apparent in some cases across broad geographic areas, were not 
identified until after Lucas’ arrest.142 
The Enterprise Policing model mandates that immediate steps be taken to 
eliminate linkage blindness in police agencies throughout the country.  The American 
public simply deserves better from its police departments.  The evolution to intelligence-
led policing is equally important.  If agencies do not take the steps to analyze and 
disseminate the information available to them, linkage blindness will continue and 
criminal threats will go unrecognized.  
Closely related to all of this is the backbone of Enterprise Policing, new 
adaptations of community policing.  As disclosed by research in the thesis, many police 
agencies still “don’t get it.”  There is much work to be done in many of America’s police 
departments to instill community policing as a philosophy and practice.  Agencies that 
fail in this effort will fall short in creating the trust and respect that they need from 
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community members.  Gathering intelligence and information sharing will be thwarted 
without public trust.  Consider the following example of a missed opportunity in this 
area. 
The Chicago area has one of the largest rail networks in the United States, making 
it a prime location for rail enthusiasts, known as railfans, to engage in their hobby of 
photographing trains from public locations.  Prior to September 11, 2001, there were few 
concerns that existed between railfans and the Metra commuter rail authorities.  All of 
that changed on the afternoon of January 8, 2005.  It was then that two railfans set up 
their tripods to photograph a commuter trains as they traveled through the suburban 
community of Morton Grove, Illinois. 
Acting on direction from the Metra police, two Morton Grove police officers 
approached the railfans, detained them, and told them that they would have to await the 
arrival of Metra police officials.  While awaiting the Metra police, the Morton Grove 
officers ran a routine identification check on the railfans and obtained permission to 
conduct a search of their truck, finding only the usual railfan paraphernalia; magazines, 
radio scanners, and timetables.   
The Metra officials arrived and told the railfans that, due to heightened security 
concerns, photography of planes, trains, automobiles, and boat traffic was now illegal.  
The railfans objected, stating that the First Amendment of the Constitution guaranteed 
their rights to photograph the trains.  The Metra officials informed the railfans that the 
laws prohibiting the photography of trains superseded the Constitution and that their film 
could be confiscated if the terrorism task force so ordered.  The railfans said that they 
would not give up their film and they expressed further concerns about their names being 
added to some federal database that could impact their freedom to fly or haunt them in 
some other way in the future.  A background check with the terrorism task force revealed 
nothing worth further detention of the railfans and they were permitted to leave with 
warnings not to photograph trains in the future, even from public sidewalks. 
That evening, the railfans decided to let others know of their misfortune in 
Morton Grove.  They posted their account of the incident into an area Internet discussion 
group and, within hours, countless e-mails flooded the online railfan community.  By the 
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following Monday morning, several of these e-mails reached the desks of Metra 
executives and the Chicago Tribune newspaper.  On January 19, the Chicago Tribune 
published a thorough front-page story on the incident titled, “Suddenly, a Suspicious 
Hobby,” raising the awareness about railroad photography and the First Amendment 
concerns.  Bill Molony, president of a National Railway Historical Society chapter was 
quoted as follows:  “The general consensus is it’s easier for a railfan to take pictures in 
China than it is here.”143  An ACLU spokesman tempered his remarks by stating that 
people generally have a right to take pictures in a public place where others do not have 
an expectation of privacy.  However, he noted that security issues could limit what people 
photograph, such as a defense facility.  This article was followed by a Tribune editorial 
titled, “Stupidity, ignorance, and the power of fear – Chicago railfans are terrorists?  Give 
me a break.” 
Metra officials responded to the criticism by “clarifying” their position.  Without 
saying that their officer was wrong, they publicly acknowledged that it was all right for 
people to photograph trains from public areas.  Railfans have responded by recognizing 
the security concerns and stated that they, too, want the railroads to be safe.  They believe 
that they could be of assistance to authorities by reporting suspicious incidents that they 
may observe. 
Of course, this has not been the only time that concerns have been brought to the 
attention of police authorities regarding possible security concerns at Chicago’s train 
systems.  In fact, the Transportation Security Agency has documented seven suspicious 
incident reports involving the rail systems since September 10, 2004.  Although police 
officials have contacted the parties involved in most of those incidents, none of them 
generated the controversy that surrounded the Morton Grove incident.  That incident 
involved a classic example of how law enforcement’s concern for security violated the 
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The learning points from this controversy are: 
• The railfan community is generally a law-abiding group.  They feel that 
they can actually contribute to transportation security by being alert for anything 
that appears to be out of place. 
• The railfan community understands the need for law enforcement officials 
to ensure public safety by checking out their activities.  However, they do not 
want to be prohibited from exercising their right to photograph a train from public 
property. 
• Apparently, some law enforcement agencies in the Chicago area were 
unaware of the rail photography hobby and laws were cited that simply did not 
exist in an attempt to curtail this hobby. 
• Education of both police officials and the railfans seems to have reduced 
this controversy at this time.           
Tactics and technology are some of the most critical areas of change because of 
the nature of Homeland Security concepts.   They are also areas in which police are most 
deficient and for which they will remain on a learning curve for some time to come.  
Although police are familiar with the concepts of conducting risk assessments, gathering 
and processing intelligence, and developing response plans for large-scale crises, they 
will need more training and education in these areas in the future.  They will also need to 
enhance their knowledge of tactics related to anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. The 
technology that will be required and the protection of that technology will also challenge 
tomorrow’s police officer in unprecedented ways.144  
Organizational change can be difficult.  Leaders who have tried to implement 
such change know that the challenge can be steep.  “They face four hurdles.  One is 
cognitive:  waking employees up to the need for a strategic shift.    The second is limited 
resources.  The greater the shift in strategy, the greater it is assumed are the resources 
needed to execute it. . . .   The third is motivation.  How do you motivate key players to 
move and tenaciously to carry out a break from the status quo? . . .  The final hurdle is 
politics.  As one manager put it, ‘In our organization you get shot down before you stand 
up.’”145   These hurdles are not insurmountable.  The following example explains how 
one agency is overcoming the hurdles to change.    
 
                                                 
144 Oliver, The Era of Homeland Security:  September 11, 2001 to . . ., 14. 
145 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean, 147-148. 
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The Naperville, Illinois Police Department is comprised of 189 sworn police 
officers and 114 non-sworn employees.  Serving a city of 140,000 residents, the 
department has a reputation for being a service oriented agency that enjoys strong 
community and political support.  In return, the residents of Naperville live in a 
community known for having a high quality of life and a low crime rate.  In 2005, Money 
magazine ranked Naperville as the third best place in the United States to live.146  
Community safety was considered as one of the factors in that rating. 
In Naperville, the shift toward an Enterprise Policing model has already begun.  
The future of the Naperville Police Department looks like this. A police officer types a 
domestic violence report on his in-car computer and makes note of hate literature found 
in the residence; a traffic officer issues a citation to a speeding motorist of a known white 
supremist group; a school resource officer intercepts hallway gossip about a garage at an 
unknown location containing several cases of empty bottles and cans of gasoline; and a 
desk officer enters a noise report involving people chanting racial slurs in a loud voice.  
The police officers in different assignments may not be aware of any connection 
between these incidents. Although each contact generates data, no pattern appears to the 
line level officers.  Add to this scenario a police intelligence analyst aided by state-of-the-
art data management tools monitoring the flow of data in real time, watching vast banks 
of information from 30,000 feet, looking for patterns, looking for the underlying network 
of a criminal or a  terrorist organization, and the connection now appears in plain view, 
yielding actionable intelligence. 
This is not techno-thriller fiction; this is the attainable reality of the Naperville 
Police Department’s strategic shift toward Enterprise Policing.  As with all organizational 
change, this shift in departmental direction from our former community policing model is 
being met with some challenges.  Two of those challenges can be described as internal to 
the organization and two are external.  The two internal challenges involve making 
employees understand the need for change and motivating them to develop the skills 
required to make change happen.  The external challenges are concerned with getting 
stakeholders (the city council and the public) to support the change and to obtain the 
                                                 
146 Tara Kalwarski, Donna Rosato and Cybele Weisser, “Best Places to Live – 2005,” Money 
(http://money.cnn.com/best/bplive/). Viewed on January 20, 2006. 
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necessary fiscal resources to purchase new technology that will enable the change to 
occur.  To overcome these challenges, leadership and commitment from several members 
of the department has been, and will continue to be, required.  
Partial success has already been achieved through budget meetings in 2004 and 
2005 with the city council.  The need for the department to become more proactive in 
homeland security issues and in addressing complex crimes that were occurring in our 
area was addressed.  There was also an explanation of why the department was not able 
to accomplish that goal with existing organizational structure and technology.  The result 
was the approval new personnel for the creation of an intelligence unit and a $150,000 
intelligence analysis software package for the first phase of necessary technology.  Once 
this has been installed and is fully operational, there may be additional costs associated 
with upgrading and adding onto this system over the next two to four years.  Partnering 
with neighboring agencies will be critical to the success of such upgrades.   
To keep the community members apprised of what is happening in the police 
department, presentations have been made at service club meetings and during citizen 
police academy sessions.  Thus far, the reactions have been positive.  Public safety is a 
priority and many in the community expect their police to take the necessary steps to 
keep the crime rate low and their neighborhoods safe. 
Making employees understand the need for change has actually been easier than 
was anticipated.  As the chief, I have personally met with several of them in team 
meetings and roll call sessions to explain how a move toward Enterprise Policing can 
help to overcome linkage blindness and benefit them personally by making them more 
effective police officers.  They seem to understand this and have not voiced dissent to the 
concept.    
The next challenge, that of motivating the officers to learn new skills and change 
the way they do things, may be much more difficult to overcome.  The abilities required 
in order to reap the greatest benefit from the technology changes will undoubtedly cause 
stress for many employees. The process of transition to a high-tech, data driven 
organization can easily result in the loss of focus on day-to-day field operations and result 
in task overload for personnel in the department.  The managers recognize that they have 
the opportunity to change the information landscape in the organization and make it 
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better, smarter, and faster, but the core business must remain centered on field operations.  
The overload hazard can be overcome through realistic planning, project management, 
and goal setting.147     
Implementation of a project of this scope must also have a management culture 
that accepts and values both positive and negative responses from the employees 
impacted by the change.  History is littered with examples of complex projects that have 
failed due to management cultures that suppress negative information and only receive 
what the bosses want to hear.  One of the key failures identified by the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board was that of a faulty NASA management culture that 
suppressed anything other than, “Go for launch!”148   To overcome this, we must 
emphasize the power of candor and open communication to extract the maximum value 
from line personnel, field supervisors, and managers. 
In order to help drive this change, each of the division commanders has been 
assigned the responsibility to manage that portion of the change that is applicable to their 
divisions and my next step will be to enlist assistance from six of the most respected and 
trusted sergeants in the department.  Through meetings that have occurred so far, one of 
the biggest issues identified is getting employees to accept a new field reporting system 
that will provide the foundation of the data bank that results in analysis for intelligence 
purposes.  The department has a long way to go in minimizing reporting errors and 
ensuring accuracy of data.  Strict accountability from the officers who type the reports 
and the supervisors who approve them will become a part of our culture in the future.  
Obviously, there will be other leadership challenges as the movement into an 
Enterprise Policing model continues.  Those challenges will be met with clear 
communication and a continuing demonstration of the necessity of this change: 
• The challenge to public safety is ever changing and the police department 
must adapt to those changes. 
• Intelligence is critical for decision making. 
• Intelligence is critical for planning and strategic targeting. 
                                                 
147 Institute for Police Research, Northwestern University, Policing Smarter Through IT:  Lessons in 
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(Washington,   DC:  NASA Government Printing Office, 2003), 170.   
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• Law enforcement cannot function effectively without having intelligence 
available and using it.   
• Intelligence is critical for crime prevention. 
• Information sharing analysis and sharing are necessary to overcome 
linkage blindness.  
• Networking with others is an absolute requirement for effective 
information sharing.  
  
 
A. CIVIL RIGHTS VERSUS SECURITY 
If police administrators who make organizational changes do not get this right, 
they will fail miserably at protecting the Constitutional rights they are fighting to 
preserve.  The protection of civil rights is a primary consideration in the proper 
adaptation on intelligence-led policing in the enterprise model. 
The power vested in the police under the Enterprise Policing Model poses a risk 
to civil liberties.  Police leaders must recognize the delicate balance that exists between 
police targeting terrorist and criminal violations versus police who sweep neighborhoods, 
searching for specific suspects, and entangling innocent people in their nets.  While the 
police use the new tactics and technology available to them, they must ensure that civil 
liberties are protected, that power is not abused, and that laws are enforced fairly.  Just as 
terrorists and criminals must be held accountable for their acts, so too must the police be 
accountable to the citizens they serve.149    
To be certain, there has been a recalibration of the balance between civil rights 
and security since the 9/11 attacks.  The American public has shown that it is willing to 
give government some leeway in this area as long as the government takes only limited, 
necessary measures to provide the security that the citizens of the country deserve.  The 
most obvious example of this can be found in airports during security screening 
processes.  It is incumbent upon police leaders to ensure that the delicate balance does not 
sway too far in either direction. 
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As police agencies become more effective at mining and analyzing data from 
disparate sources, their challenge is to ensure that mistakes of the past are not repeated 
and that their intelligence units or officers are used for their intended purpose of ensuring 
community safety.       
With each of these challenges, comes an opportunity.  For the police executive, 
the opportunity is to demonstrate leadership and vision in his agency and his community.  
In dealing with the media, it is important to take every opportunity to remember that, 
“America’s media, for all their problems, form a cornerstone of our freedom.”150  The 
police must recognize this, provide the media with complete, accurate information as 
long as it does not compromise tactics or investigations, and ‘never start a war with 
people who buy ink by the barrelful.’  
By overcoming the hurdles associated with organizational change, the police 
executive can make his agency more effective at fighting crime and ensuring safety of 
those he was sworn to protect.  To reiterate the words of Martin Van Creveld, “Either we 
make the necessary changes . . . or what is commonly known as the modern world will 
lose all sense of security and dwell in perpetual fear.”151  It is possible to make those 
necessary changes.  Establishing the Enterprise Policing model can provide American 
law enforcement with the philosophical anchor needed to navigate the dangerous passage 
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23.20 Operating principles. 
23.30 Funding guidelines. 
23.40 Monitoring and auditing of grants for the funding of  
intelligence systems. 
Authority:  
42 U.S.C. 3782(a); 42 U.S.C. 3789g(c). 
Source:  
58 FR 48452, Sept. 16, 1993, unless otherwise noted. 
§23.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this regulation is to assure that all criminal intelligence systems operating 
through support under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. 3711, et seq., as amended (Pub. L. 90–351, as amended by Pub. L. 91–644, Pub. 
L. 93–83, Pub. L. 93–415, Pub. L. 94–430, Pub. L. 94–503, Pub. L. 95–115, Pub. L. 96–
157, Pub. L. 98–473, Pub. L. 99–570, Pub. L. 100–690, and Pub. L. 101–647), are 
utilized in conformance with the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals. 
§23.2 Background 
It is recognized that certain criminal activities, including but not limited to loan sharking, 
drug trafficking, trafficking in stolen property, gambling, extortion, smuggling, bribery, 
and corruption of public officials, often involve some degree of regular coordination and 
permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad 
geographical area. The exposure of such ongoing networks of criminal activity can be 
aided by the pooling of information about such activities. However, because the 
collection and exchange of intelligence data necessary to support control of serious 
criminal activity may represent potential threats to the privacy of individuals to whom 




(a) These policy standards are applicable to all criminal intelligence systems operating 
through support under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. 3711, et seq., as amended (Pub. L. 90–351, as amended by Pub. L. 91–644, Pub. 
L. 93–83, Pub. L. 93–415, Pub. L. 94–430, Pub. L. 94–503, Pub. L. 95–115, Pub. L. 96–
157, Pub. L. 98–473, Pub. L. 99–570, Pub. L. 100–690, and Pub. L. 101–647). 
(b) As used in these policies: 
(1) Criminal Intelligence System or Intelligence System means the arrangements, 
equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, storage, interagency exchange 
or dissemination, and analysis of criminal intelligence information; 
(2) Interjurisdictional Intelligence System means an intelligence system which involves 
two or more participating agencies representing different governmental units or 
jurisdictions; 
(3) Criminal Intelligence Information means data which has been evaluated to determine 
that it: 
(i) Is relevant to the identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual 
who or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, 
and 
(ii) Meets criminal intelligence system submission criteria; 
(4) Participating Agency means an agency of local, county, State, Federal, or other 
governmental unit which exercises law enforcement or criminal investigation authority 
and which is authorized to submit and receive criminal intelligence information through 
an interjurisdictional intelligence system. A participating agency may be a member or a 
nonmember of an interjurisdictional intelligence system; 
(5) Intelligence Project or Project means the organizational unit which operates an 
intelligence system on behalf of and for the benefit of a single agency or the organization 
which operates an interjurisdictional intelligence system on behalf of a group of 
participating agencies; and 
(6) Validation of Information means the procedures governing the periodic review of 
criminal intelligence information to assure its continuing compliance with system 





§23.20 Operating principles 
(a) A project shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an 
individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal 
conduct or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity. 
(b) A project shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information about the 
political, religious or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or any 
group, association, corporation, business, partnership, or other organization unless such 
information directly relates to criminal conduct or activity and there is reasonable 
suspicion that the subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct or 
activity. 
(c) Reasonable Suspicion or Criminal Predicate is established when information exists 
which establishes sufficient facts to give a trained law enforcement or criminal 
investigative agency officer, investigator, or employee a basis to believe that there is a 
reasonable possibility that an individual or organization is involved in a definable 
criminal activity or enterprise. In an interjurisdictional intelligence system, the project is 
responsible for establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
either through examination of supporting information submitted by a participating agency 
or by delegation of this responsibility to a properly trained participating agency which is 
subject to routine inspection and audit procedures established by the project. 
(d) A project shall not include in any criminal intelligence system information which has 
been obtained in violation of any applicable Federal, State, or local law or ordinance. In 
an interjurisdictional intelligence system, the project is responsible for establishing that 
no information is entered in violation of Federal, State, or local laws, either through 
examination of supporting information submitted by a participating agency or by 
delegation of this responsibility to a properly trained participating agency which is 
subject to routine inspection and audit procedures established by the project. 
(e) A project or authorized recipient shall disseminate criminal intelligence information 
only where there is a need to know and a right to know the information in the 
performance of a law enforcement activity. 
(f)(1) Except as noted in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, a project shall disseminate 
criminal intelligence information only to law enforcement authorities who shall agree to 
follow procedures regarding information receipt, maintenance, security, and 
dissemination which are consistent with these principles. 
(2) Paragraph (f)(1) of this section shall not limit the dissemination of an assessment of 
criminal intelligence information to a government official or to any other individual, 
when necessary, to avoid imminent danger to life or property. 
(g) A project maintaining criminal intelligence information shall ensure that 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards (including audit trails) are adopted to 
insure against unauthorized access and against intentional or unintentional damage.  A 
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record indicating who has been given information, the reason for release of the 
information, and the date of each dissemination outside the project shall be kept. 
Information shall be labeled to indicate levels of sensitivity, levels of confidence, and the 
identity of submitting agencies and control officials. Each project must establish written 
definitions for the need to know and right to know standards for dissemination to other 
agencies as provided in paragraph (e) of this section. The project is responsible for 
establishing the existence of an inquirer's need to know and right to know the information 
being requested either through inquiry or by delegation of this responsibility to a properly 
trained participating agency which is subject to routine inspection and audit procedures 
established by the project. Each intelligence project shall assure that the following 
security requirements are implemented: 
(1) Where appropriate, projects must adopt effective and technologically advanced 
computer software and hardware designs to prevent unauthorized access to the 
information contained in the system; 
(2) The project must restrict access to its facilities, operating environment and 
documentation to organizations and personnel authorized by the project; 
(3) The project must store information in the system in a manner such that it cannot be 
modified, destroyed, accessed, or purged without authorization; 
(4) The project must institute procedures to protect criminal intelligence information 
from unauthorized access, theft, sabotage, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade 
disaster; 
(5) The project must promulgate rules and regulations based on good cause for 
implementing its authority to screen, reject for employment, transfer, or remove 
personnel authorized to have direct access to the system; and 
(6) A project may authorize and utilize remote (off-premises) system data bases to the 
extent that they comply with these security requirements. 
(h) All projects shall adopt procedures to assure that all information which is retained by 
a project has relevancy and importance. Such procedures shall provide for the periodic 
review of information and the destruction of any information which is misleading, 
obsolete or otherwise unreliable and shall require that any recipient agencies be advised 
of such changes which involve errors or corrections. All information retained as a result 
of this review must reflect the name of the reviewer, date of review and explanation of 
decision to retain. Information retained in the system must be reviewed and validated for 
continuing compliance with system submission criteria before the expiration of its 
retention period, which in no event shall be longer than five (5) years. 
(i) If funds awarded under the Act are used to support the operation of an intelligence 
system, then: 
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(1) No project shall make direct remote terminal access to intelligence information 
available to system participants, except as specifically approved by the Office of Justice 
Programs (OJP) based on a determination that the system has adequate policies and 
procedures in place to insure that it is accessible only to authorized systems users; and 
(2) A project shall undertake no major modifications to system design without prior 
grantor agency approval. 
(ii) [Reserved] 
(j) A project shall notify the grantor agency prior to initiation of formal information 
exchange procedures with any Federal, State, regional, or other information systems not 
indicated in the grant documents as initially approved at time of award. 
(k) A project shall make assurances that there will be no purchase or use in the course of 
the project of any electronic, mechanical, or other device for surveillance purposes that is 
in violation of the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
Public Law 99–508, 18 U.S.C. 2510–2520, 2701–2709 and 3121–3125, or any applicable 
State statute related to wiretapping and surveillance. 
(l) A project shall make assurances that there will be no harassment or interference with 
any lawful political activities as part of the intelligence operation. 
(m) A project shall adopt sanctions for unauthorized access, utilization, or disclosure of 
information contained in the system. 
(n) A participating agency of an interjurisdictional intelligence system must maintain in 
its agency files information which documents each submission to the system and supports 
compliance with project entry criteria. Participating agency files supporting system 
submissions must be made available for reasonable audit and inspection by project 
representatives. Project representatives will conduct participating agency inspection and 
audit in such a manner so as to protect the confidentiality and sensitivity of participating 
agency intelligence records. 
(o) The Attorney General or designee may waive, in whole or in part, the applicability of 
a particular requirement or requirements contained in this part with respect to a criminal 
intelligence system, or for a class of submitters or users of such system, upon a clear and 
convincing showing that such waiver would enhance the collection, maintenance or 
dissemination of information in the criminal intelligence system, while ensuring that such 
system would not be utilized in violation of the privacy and constitutional rights of 
individuals or any applicable state or federal law. 
§23.30 Funding guidelines 
The following funding guidelines shall apply to all Crime Control Act funded 
discretionary assistance awards and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) formula grant 
program subgrants, a purpose of which is to support the operation of an intelligence 
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system. Intelligence systems shall only be funded where a grantee/subgrantee agrees to 
adhere to the principles set forth above and the project meets the following criteria: 
(a) The proposed collection and exchange of criminal intelligence information has been 
coordinated with and will support ongoing or proposed investigatory or prosecutorial 
activities relating to specific areas of criminal activity. 
(b) The areas of criminal activity for which intelligence information is to be utilized 
represent a significant and recognized threat to the population and: 
(1) Are either undertaken for the purpose of seeking illegal power or profits or pose a 
threat to the life and property of citizens; and 
(2) Involve a significant degree of permanent criminal organization; or 
(3) Are not limited to one jurisdiction. 
(c) The head of a government agency or an individual with general policy making 
authority who has been expressly delegated such control and supervision by the head of 
the agency will retain control and supervision of information collection and 
dissemination for the criminal intelligence system. This official shall certify in writing 
that he or she takes full responsibility and will be accountable for the information 
maintained by and disseminated from the system and that the operation of the system will 
be in compliance with the principles set forth in §23.20. 
(d)(1) Where the system is an interjurisdictional criminal intelligence system, the 
governmental agency which exercises control and supervision over the operation of the 
system shall require that the head of that agency or an individual with general 
policymaking authority who has been expressly delegated such control and supervision 
by the head of the agency: 
(i) Assume official responsibility and accountability for actions taken in the name of the 
joint entity, and 
(ii) Certify in writing that the official takes full responsibility and will be accountable for 
insuring that the information transmitted to the interjurisdictional system or to 
participating agencies will be in compliance with the principles set forth in §23.20. 
(2) The principles set forth in §23.20 shall be made part of the by-laws or operating 
procedures for that system. Each participating agency, as a condition of participation, 
must accept in writing those principles which govern the submission, maintenance and 
dissemination of information included as part of the interjurisdictional system. 
(e) Intelligence information will be collected, maintained and disseminated primarily for 
State and local law enforcement efforts, including efforts involving Federal participation. 
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§23.40 Monitoring and auditing of grants for the funding of intelligence systems 
(a) Awards for the funding of intelligence systems will receive specialized monitoring 
and audit in accordance with a plan designed to insure compliance with operating 
principles as set forth in §23.20. The plan shall be approved prior to award of funds. 
(b) All such awards shall be subject to a special condition requiring compliance with the 
principles set forth in §23.20. 
(c) An annual notice will be published by OJP which will indicate the existence and the 
objective of all systems for the continuing interjurisdictional exchange of criminal 
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